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From the Editor
Welcome to the Spring 2017 issue of CTX. Our production process has gone 
through some changes over the last two quarters, and we will publish fewer 
issues in Volume 7 (2017) than in previous years. That does not mean, however, 
that the quality of the articles and columns we publish will be affected in any 
way, except as we continually try to improve the journal based on what you, 
our readers, tell us about what you want to read. We’ve gotten quite a bit of 
feedback on the November 2016 special issue (Volume 6, number 4), which 
was devoted to the topic of hybrid warfare and how the NATO alliance should 
prepare to respond when members are threatened by means other than armed 
force. We’d love to hear from you at CTXeditor@GlobalECCO.org or on 
Facebook whenever you read something in CTX that sparks your interest, raises 
questions, or demands a response. After all, you’re the reason we publish CTX.
The first article in this issue comes from Vera Mironova, in collaboration with 
Mohammed Hussein, based on her firsthand observations in Iraq and personal 
interviews with former ISIS members. Mironova is a terrorism expert whose 
research focuses on the ways in which terrorist groups organize their labor 
requirements. Here she describes how the decline in ISIS’s fortunes is forcing the 
group to turn to imprisonment and coercion to man its frontlines and keep its 
war machine running. 
The next two articles examine terrorism in the maritime domain. First is Paul 
Shemella’s discussion of the potential for terrorist activity in and around the 
Mediterranean Sea by al Qaeda, ISIS, and their supporters. Many observers warn 
that as the fighting across Syria and Iraq turns against ISIS, and as the Caliphate 
project crumbles, extremists will look for ways to retaliate against “soft” targets 
through acts of terror. Shemella examines a multitude of vulnerabilities in the 
Mediterranean region, from shipping, transport, and tourism, to oil produc-
tion and port operations. With the addition of the refugee crisis and the rise of 
anti-EU nationalism, European governments are finding it increasingly difficult 
to cooperate on finding solutions. 
The second of our maritime articles deals with the rising danger posed to critical 
port facilities by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, or “drones”). Port security 
expert John Caton uses an analytical tool developed by the US Coast Guard 
to evaluate the threat that drones pose to port operations, based on the actual 
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profile of a major port on the US West Coast. Although his discussion of possible countermeasures draws on the security 
and legal environment in the United States, Caton’s analysis could be adapted to major ports in most of the world.
Next, Jonathan Nagle explores the similarities between ISIS and the American millennialist Christian sect called the 
Branch Davidians. When the Davidians began stockpiling arms, US law enforcement agencies ignored advice from experts 
who urged them to take their time to understand the group’s motivations. The result was a tragedy that, Nagle warns, is 
being repeated on a global scale by the West’s failure to understand the influence of Salafist millennialism on ISIS’s leaders 
and followers.  
The final article, by Anders Westberg, describes the rapid rise of violent criminal motorcycle gangs in Sweden, and the 
struggle of the Swedish polity to adapt its laws—and attitudes—to confront this expanding threat.
We have two CTAP interviews for you in this issue. In the first, Vera Mironova delves further into her research on how ISIS 
is managing its labor force as the wars in Syria and Iraq turn against it. With the ideologues dead, the conscripts running 
away, and no more money to lure mercenaries, how can the ISIS human resources division keep the ranks filled? The second 
interview is with Bruce Hoffman, who has been researching and writing on a wide range of terrorism-related topics since 
the late 1970s. He and interviewer Michael Freeman explore the reasons why terrorism persists as a useful tool for political 
outsiders despite claims that “it doesn’t work.” They also discuss what distinguishes today’s terrorist organizations from 
their historical predecessors and whether the US-led military coalition that is fighting ISIS has learned anything from its 
past experience with al Qaeda (the answer, according to Hoffman is “no”).
In the Ethics and Insights column, George Lober asks readers to ponder the importance of honor and truth and the role 
of the “silent professional” in military culture. As he has done in all of his columns for CTX over the years, Lober zeroes in 
on the moral and ethical paradoxes that military service presents to the people who fight for their country. Lober recently 
retired from teaching at the US Naval Postgraduate School but promised he would continue contributing to CTX as his 
writing schedule allows. His ethics columns have been a highlight of this journal since its founding, and we intend to hold 
him to that promise. 
Our book review comes from Fatih Celenay, who discusses David Kilcullen’s book Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age 
of the Urban Guerrilla. And in the Publications section, you will find a number of new titles from the Joint Special Opera-
tions University to peruse.
We encourage you again to send your article submissions, comments, and questions to CTXeditor@GlobalECCO.org. You 
can follow CTX and join in discussions with your fellow readers on Facebook at Global ECCO. We look forward to hearing 
from you.
ELIZABETH SKINNER
Managing Editor, CTX 
CTXEditor@globalecco.org
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ISIS Prisons:  Where Labor Demand Meets 
Labor Supply
Vera Mironova, Belfer Center for 
Science and International Affairs,  
and Mohammed Hussein, Iraq Oil 
Report
Armed groups rely on various types of labor resources.1  
Among these laborers are people who are dedicated to the goals of the group, 
people who are only interested in immediate profit, and people who don’t want 
anything to do with the work or the war, but have no choice—those who are 
forced to labor. Forced labor is the least preferable source of labor for any armed 
group, but as ISIS recently started losing its war in Iraq and its financial resources, 
it was faced with fewer labor supply options and greater demand for labor. 
Prisoners, ISIS found, were a good way to meet the demand, and the group now 
uses prisoners for both intellectual work in the chemical labs and hard labor in 
its sophisticated tunnel system.
Sophisticated Engineering
In July 2016, ISIS began construction of a pipeline from Iraq’s Qayyarah oil fields 
to the Tigris River. The plan was to mix crude oil into the water and let it flow 
downstream, where it would accumulate around a temporary plastic bridge 
built by the Iraqi Army. The oil would then be set on fire, effectively melting the 
bridge and putting it out of service. Fortunately, coalition airstrikes thwarted the 
would-be disaster, but the existence of the plan shines light on a disturbing fact. 
This pipeline was not the brainchild of uneducated terrorists. It took knowledge 
and skill. It took expertise. 
The pipeline is just one example of the more complicated tactics emerging from 
the ISIS corner in recent times. The group has also managed to produce chlorine 
gas, which it used extensively against Kurdish and Iraqi forces; successfully 
operate oil refineries; and construct a deep underground tunnel network with its 
own airflow system. These activities prompt the question: how are ISIS guerilla 
fighters developing and executing such sophisticated operations? 
A survey of ISIS member profiles, including its leadership, reveals that few, if 
any, ISIS personnel are even remotely capable of designing or implementing such 
projects.2 They have neither the education nor the necessary experience in the 
necessary fields.3 Furthermore, very few of the former Baath Party members who 
joined ISIS would do this kind of work because they are more concerned with 
getting promotions than advancing science. Could the engineers and scientists 
ISIS is using be from among the foreign fighters who have joined the cause? Prob-
ably not. Many of these fighters lack even a secondary school diploma and are 
more interested in having four wives than in developing military stratagems. The 
planners behind these complex operations are also unlikely to come from among 
the locals who joined for money and power because if they had those kinds of 
skills, employment by ISIS would not be their only way to earn money.
It’s not that ISIS hasn’t tried to recruit from among the educated and professional 
classes. In 2014, the group was producing highly professional advertisements to recruit 
doctors and spreading the word through their social media networks that they wanted 
PRISONERS, ISIS 
FOUND, WERE 
A GOOD WAY 
TO MEET THE 
DEMAND.
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to hire engineers at a good salary.4 But that strategy didn’t seem to work. For most 
skilled professionals, working for ISIS isn’t on their list of career objectives.
Professional Prisoners
So how is ISIS getting the people it needs? It is acquiring them by making them 
prisoners, a practice that is widespread in ISIS-controlled parts of Iraq.5
There are three types of ISIS prisoners. First are members of ISIS who have 
violated its rules, for example, getting caught smoking or not showing up for 
mandatory prayer. Although these kinds of offenders are usually sentenced to 
public lashing (for propaganda purposes), prison is also a viable option. Second 
are those whom ISIS considers dangerous or who are accused of cooperating 
with the enemy. These people are usually sentenced to death. The third category 
of prisoners consists of those whose only crime is being good at what they do. 
These are the “on-demand” prisoners, skilled professionals and laborers ISIS 
extorts for its own purposes. And every ISIS official, even at the lowest rank, has 
the authority to conduct arrests.
Engineers of various kinds are in high in demand. Petroleum-sector engineers 
are sent to work in oil refineries, mechanical engineers are made to assemble 
car bombs, and military engineers are typically used to train ISIS members. As 
soon as ISIS entered the Iraqi city of Mosul in mid-2014, it was in desperate need 
of oil tanker trucks and drivers.6 At the time, ISIS had the money to pay tanker 
drivers—and coalition airstrikes were not as intense—so the group was able to 
hire the people it needed. After a year, however, the tanker drivers’ pay decreased 
because ISIS lost control of several oil fields in Salahadin and south of Kirkuk. 
Oil tankers also became direct targets for US-led coalition warplanes. Lack of 
payment and increased risk made drivers avoid working in ISIS-held territories 
in Iraq. In response, ISIS simply forced tanker operators who owned their trucks 
to work by putting them in jail on fake charges. ISIS negotiated with the impris-
oned owner-operators: they could drive their own tankers for ISIS for a specified 
amount of time in exchange for their freedom. 
Once this problem was solved, ISIS needed construction equipment, so it ar-
rested the owner of a construction company in Mosul on nonsense charges. After 
keeping him in jail for several days and torturing him, ISIS freed him in exchange 
for the use of his company’s machines, shovels, and excavators. It was a hostage-
deal situation. The contractor was allowed to live with his family in Mosul, but 
his company was used by ISIS militants. ISIS gave him a little money to maintain 
the machines and pay his machinery operators.7 
Military engineers are especially helpful because of their expertise in sophisti-
cated weaponry, but they are relegated to the training camps because they cannot 
be trusted on the front lines. That may have something to do with the way they 
were recruited. In an interview, one man described his family’s situation.
My dad was a brigade leader in the Iraqi Army’s 5th division. ISIS 
arrested him without any reason in early 2015, in front of our house. 
After several days, a local ISIS leader informed us that my dad had 
been sentenced to death. Two months later, we found out that my 
dad was still alive but had to train ISIS militants on using some 
advanced weapons. He has to do whatever ISIS wants from him. 
FOR MOST SKILLED 
PROFESSIONALS, 
WORKING FOR ISIS 




In return, ISIS lets him and his family stay alive. If he declines to 
cooperate, ISIS would kill him and us.8
Another group of sought-after professionals for ISIS is scientists, with chemical 
engineers and physicists in particular demand. Those in Iraq are mostly profes-
sors from Mosul University, which lies in ISIS-controlled territory. The scientists 
and their laboratories at the university have been forcefully commissioned to 
develop more deadly chemical weapons for ISIS. Although these workers are 
more privileged than other prisoners and are allowed to spend their nights at 
home, they are under constant surveillance. They cannot escape, nor can they 
refuse to work for ISIS. According to one eyewitness, several chemical scientists 
in Mosul University who refused to work were killed on the spot in the labora-
tory, to serve as an example. 
Medical doctors have also recently joined the ranks of professional prisoners. 
Because ISIS casualties are increasing, so is the demand for doctors. Although 
most doctors have never refused treatment to ISIS militants at the civilian 
hospitals, since the beginning of the campaign to retake Mosul in October 2016, 
many have been forced to work exclusively for the group on the front line.9  
If ISIS asks a doctor to relocate to a field hospital and he refuses, he is arrested, 
sent to prison, and forcefully transferred to the field hospital. There he is treated 
well, but his movement and freedom are still restricted, and like the engineers, 
his family is kept under threat. 
A Choice of Deaths
ISIS is also increasingly relying on prisoners to man its frontline positions. With 
the Iraqi Army and US-led coalition forces advancing and gaining more territory, 
ISIS is taking more and more casualties on its front lines, particularly in and 
around the contested city of Mosul. This is making it harder and harder for ISIS 
not only to entice fighters to volunteer for frontline combat, but even to make 
fighters follow orders to relocate to such places. For instance, around 2 August 
2016, a firefight broke out among ISIS militants in a crowded Mosul market over 
occupation of the Bab al-Tub administrative office in central Mosul. Both groups 
wanted to stay in that peaceful neighborhood rather than go to the front line. 
Similarly, ISIS was previously able to rely on volunteers to conduct suicide 
missions, but those fighters are for one-time use, and now the group seems to be 
running out of them. To both solve this problem and man the most dangerous 
frontline positions, ISIS must compel people against their will, including ISIS 
militants who were sentenced to death, perhaps for spying or from takfiri—a 
practice of excommunication by which one Muslim declares another Muslim 
to be a kafir, a non-believer. ISIS leaders regularly accuse members who do not 
agree with the leadership of being kafir.10 Such prisoners are often given the 
option of either being executed immediately or being sent to whichever is the 
most dangerous frontline at the time—a choice that most likely also means a 
quick death. In this way, ISIS not only mans the most undesirable positions, 
but it also eliminates people who disagree with group policies and who could 
potentially destabilize the group. “Definitely this front line is where ISIS 
punishes its militants by forcing them to stay. I heard that they sent punished 
militants from Syria to here,” noted Dlshad Mala, a Peshmerga battalion leader 
in the south of Kirkuk.11 
PRISONERS ARE GIVEN 
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A Street to Prison to Tunnels Pipeline
In addition to highly-educated professionals and disposable fighters, strong young 
men capable of performing hard labor in Iraq’s notoriously hot weather are also in 
demand. Since ISIS has come under constant attack by the US-led coalition, it has 
been forced to take defensive positions. Its fighters have started digging tunnels 
on the front lines to hide from airstrikes and move between positions unnoticed 
by drones. In addition to engineering experts, the tunnels require unskilled 
manpower in large quantities, especially because ISIS kills, on the spot, anyone 
who is not doing his job well: Peshmerga personnel reported finding mass graves 
near major tunnels.12 And when ISIS runs low on manpower, no problem. If there 
is a demand from headquarters, there will be a supply from the prison system.
At first, ISIS was using the “human resources” it already had in its prisons, even 
bringing condemned convicts overnight from as far away as Fallujah to the 
Mosul front lines.13 Many of these prisoners were made to dig tunnels as punish-
ment for violations inside the prison. One person imprisoned in an ISIS jail re-
calls his cellmate’s punishment of digging five meters of a tunnel without rest for 
insulting a guard. Peshmerga Colonel Said Omer added, “As far as we know … a 
rotation for prisoner groups on the digging site is a week. ISIS brought them to 
work in the tunnels for a week and then took them back to their jails.”14 But the 
prisons’ existing labor supply was eventually depleted. To meet the constantly 
rising demand for labor, ISIS increased its supply of prisoners by modifying its 
imprisonment rules. And where could they find young, physically fit males for 
such a purpose? The enemy armed forces. 
When ISIS first took control in parts of Iraq, it asked captured members of 
the Iraqi military and police force to sign a tawba (declaration of repentance) 
saying, “I withdraw from the sin of joining army/police forces. I stop working 
for them and declare my regret to God.” Anyone who signed was then released. 
Officers usually signed, but soldiers were not sure if they had to, and many did 
not. When the demand for labor arose, ISIS went back to its lists and arrested 
everyone who had not signed a tawba. They even arrested some who had. This 
allowed ISIS to continue tunnel construction without delays.15 
ISIS has also used prison laborers to clean up the destruction caused by coalition 
bombings. Near Qayyarah, a small town south of Mosul, some oil fields were 
targeted many times by coalition warplanes. During the night, ISIS brought 
prisoners in to clean up the mess that the day’s airstrike had caused, according to 
an employee of Iraq’s state-owned North Oil Company (NOC) who works in the 
Qayyarah fields and still lives in the area: 
ISIS used to bring the prisoner-laborers during the nights, but more 
than four times I encountered them while working in the fields. I 
saw the workers during daytime, as they could not finish their task 
on time and stayed in the fields until late morning. There were some 
ISIS militants guarding the workers, who are more than 100 laborers. 
I was not allowed to interact with them. We just assumed that they 
were prison-laborers.16
After each airstrike, ISIS launched a huge cleanup effort because it desperately 
needed the oil and its revenue. The majority of NOC workers fled to Baghdad 
Dining hall in the training camp
An ISIS training camp and living 
base in a Mosul neighborhood
Documents and even a cell 
phone were left.




and Kurdistan, so ISIS had to fill this gap with prison labor. A local who still lives 
in the area reported that
the prison laborers used to work definitely like robots. They were 
very calm, sad, and slowly functioning. They had no normal chat and 
interaction while working, as any normal labor force would. Some 
of them could not do their jobs well and had physical disabilities. 
They looked like ill and wounded people.17
The Prisoner to Housemaid Pipeline
For domestic help, ISIS targets women traveling through ISIS-controlled territo-
ries. These may be Syrian refugees from Damascus or women from Daraa fleeing 
to Turkey through Palmyra or Basra. A woman is first stopped “for an investiga-
tion,” and if she is traveling alone—which is an ISIS violation—she is arrested 
and forced to work in an ISIS member’s home. Although she may be working in 
the house of one of the fighters instead of being thrown into prison, the work is 
still hard, the door is still closed from the outside, and she is not allowed to go 
out. The only thing that can save a woman from such forced labor is agreeing to 
marry one of the fighters.18
Conclusion
By such widespread use of forced—essentially slave—labor, ISIS joins the ranks 
of regimes like Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Russia, among many others, which 
found themselves unable to meet constantly increasing labor demands for 
wartime, industrialization, and agriculture. The key differences between ISIS 
and those regimes are that, first, ISIS is controlling a much smaller territory, and 
as a result, the available forced labor is not sufficient for its needs; and second, 
because of the conditions in Iraq before ISIS’s rise, there is a big difference in the 
quality of those labor resources. Both Germany during the Third Reich and the 
USSR under Stalin had highly developed scientific research sectors and some 
of the world’s best-known academics in war-applicable fields such as chemistry 
and physics, and particularly in engineering. In Iraq, by contrast, academia and 
scientific research were destroyed by previous wars, while everyone who was 
internationally competitive either left the country or was killed.19 (This could 
help explain why ISIS uses chlorine gas, a type of chemical weapon that origi-
nated back in WWI.) Dr. Mohammed Wajih, a former agriculture professor who 
worked at Mosul University for 20 years, explains:
The academic community and scientific research at Mosul Uni-
versity are not developed. Labs and scientific instruments in the 
university are too old, dating back to 1980, when the Iraq-Iran war 
started, and Iraq stopped investing in the universities. Lack of any 
interaction between the academic community, industrial projects, 
and businesspeople left professors with little scientific knowledge. It 
was also forbidden to teach theoretical materials related to anything 
that could be used in wars. And there are very few facilities that 
could be used to produce materials needed for war and weaponry.20
Understanding the complicated human resources problems of ISIS and other 
insurgency groups helps their opponents develop better tactics for fighting them. 
If we know that we are fighting people who do not want to fight us in the first 
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place, such as the forced labor pool that ISIS is now sending to the front lines, 
then instead of trying to defeat them, we need to help these men and women 
pass intelligence to us, defect to our side, or even sabotage the terrorist group 
from inside. By lumping all ISIS fighters and workers under the heading of 
“violent extremist,” we may be killing people who can help us. v
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Vera Mironova is an International Security Fellow, Belfer Center for Science 
and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School. 
Mohammed Hussein is deputy director of the Kurdistan Bureau at Iraq Oil 
Report.
Copyright 2017, Vera Mironova and Mohammed Hussein. The US federal government is granted 
for itself and others acting on its behalf in perpetuity a paid-up, nonexclusive, irrevocable world-
wide license in this work to reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute copies to the public, 
and perform publicly and display publicly, by or on behalf of the US federal government. All other 
rights are reserved by the copyright owner(s). Foreign copyrights may apply.
NOTES 
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months of fieldwork on the Mosul and Kirkuk front lines in Iraq, 
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Serving as the crossroads of three continents, the Mediter-
ranean Sea has carried warships, commerce, and culture since the dawn of 
civilization.1 It was at the very center of the ancient Western world and enabled 
the earliest surges of globalization. In the twenty-first century, the Mediter-
ranean still makes it possible for much of the world to share the benefits of hu-
man development, but it also conveys the consequences of insecurity. Refugees 
from war and migrants seeking a better life (and criminals exploiting both) 
ply its waters day and night, creating a host of security issues for the region’s 
governments. The imperatives of traditional maritime security, pitting empires 
and superpowers against each other, have been replaced by circumstances that 
compel European governments to cooperate in the pursuit of human security 
for people on the move, and for their own citizens.2 The origins of and statistics 
about this human tide are well documented. This article evaluates the vulnera-
bility of European societies to terrorist activity on and from the Mediterranean 
Sea as a consequence of the current refugee and migrant crisis.
Since 1985, the hijacking of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro by four Pales-
tinian gunmen has been the emblem of maritime terrorism in the Mediterranean 
region. The conventional wisdom was (and still is, to some degree) that terrorists 
wishing to attack Europeans would launch those attacks from European soil 
rather than accept the operational risks associated with maritime operations. 
The flow of refugees and migrants from the Middle East and North Africa into 
Europe, coupled with relative freedom of movement within much of Europe, has 
reinforced the notion that terrorists will continue to exploit European security 
weaknesses ashore. The Paris attacks of November 2015 seemed to support this 
theory until it was discovered that at least one of the terrorists may have entered 
Europe by sea via a refugee center on the Greek island of Leros.3 As European 
border protection authorities attempt to seal off eastern approaches, the rise of 
ISIS’s influence in Libya is focusing attention on a reemergence of the central 
Mediterranean as a route for terrorist operatives to reach Europe.4
People’s conception of maritime terrorism has expanded with the 
new century. In the aftermath of 9/11, the mayor of Boston banned 
the entry of liquid natural gas (LNG) tankers into the port for three 
weeks, fearing the ships could be used as floating bombs to attack 
the city.5 Within weeks of the 9/11 attacks, an Egyptian man, 
thought to be a member of al Qaeda and carrying airport maps 
and security passes, was discovered living in a shipping container 
bound for Canada.6 Attacks on the USS Cole (2000) and MV 
Limburg (2002) in Yemen caused American and French authori-
ties to examine the vulnerabilities of ships both in port and at sea 
more thoroughly.7 In 2004, the Philippine Abu Sayyaf terrorist 
group effectively sank SuperFerry 14 with only a small amount of 
explosive placed inside a television set.8 The Mumbai attacks of 2008 
added two more dimensions to the image of maritime terrorism: The Achille Lauro
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the potential for using ship hijacking as a means to infiltrate maritime terrorists 
into a target location and the extreme vulnerability of port cities to terrorists 
coming from offshore.9 A catastrophic accidental explosion aboard the Deepwater 
Horizon oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico in 2011 and its devastating environ-
mental impact caused terrorism experts to consider the destructive potential 
and environmental hazard of deliberate attacks on such infrastructure.10 In 2013, 
Malaysian insurgents attacked the towns of Zamboanga City and Lahad Datu 
using dense maritime traffic in the Sulu Sea to mask their tactical approaches.11 
Using a surface-to-surface missile, small boats from Yemen’s Houthi militia 
destroyed a high-tech logistics ship belonging to the United Arab Emirates while 
it was underway near the Bab al-Mandab Strait in October 2016. This attack 
could presage other such operations in the Mediterranean.12
Mediterranean Targets
The Mediterranean Sea and its long littoral are expansive enough to contain a 
limitless supply of potential targets but compact enough to make most of them 
vulnerable to acts of terrorism. Maritime commerce is literally the lifeblood of 
the Mediterranean economy, while tourism adds significant revenue to most state 
coffers. Cruise ships carrying thousands of passengers to port cities near zones 
of conflict are difficult to sink but relatively easy to hijack.13 The Mediterranean 
passenger ferry network is dense, connecting countries and cities on the sea’s rim 
as well as its myriad islands.14 Ferries are not difficult to sink, and the 1994 MS Es-
tonia and 2014 Sewol disasters reminded European officials that these ferries are 
dangerous even in the absence of deliberate attacks.15 Maritime-critical infrastruc-
ture is everywhere, and large cities have proliferated in the coastal zone. Crude 
oil carriers and liquefied gas tankers crisscross the sea, and petroleum pipelines 
line the shore. Recent uncertainty in the Middle East and Russia has prompted 
European nations to expand LNG facilities in the Mediterranean, and more are 
planned.16 With crowded beaches on all shores, the region is awash in human 
targets vulnerable to maritime attacks.17 Finally, the Mediterranean Sea, like all 
vast maritime spaces, provides terrorists with easy access to Europe through an 
environment that is largely ungoverned and very difficult to monitor.18 
Attacking ships underway with small boats is a well-established tactic, tracing 
back to the Sea Tigers of Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tigers insurgency in the 1980s.19 It 
is most effective when a target ship is in the process of transiting a choke point, 
especially if the ship has to slow down. A fast boat rigged with explosives could 
hide at one end of a narrow passage, leaping the distance to its target before the 
crew would be able to react. The Mediterranean passages that are most obviously 
vulnerable to this mode of attack include the Strait of Gibraltar, the Bosporus, 
the Dardanelles, and the Suez Canal.20 Others include the straits of Messina and 
Bonafacio, as well as the narrow channels separating mainland Turkey from the 
Greek islands of Lesbos, Chios, Leros, and Kos, where humanitarian operations 
at sea are ongoing. In a wide-ranging tourist economy, fast boats can be rented 
near the site of a planned attack. Terrorists can also rent sailboats at numerous 
marinas around the Mediterranean that cater to the international “bareboat” 
vacationing set.21 Rented boats can bring attackers ashore on remote beaches, 
away from airports and border checkpoints, perhaps to be met by accomplices 
already in place, affording them access to a wide variety of tactical objectives.
TERRORISTS CAN 
RENT SAILBOATS AT 
NUMEROUS MARINAS 
THAT CATER TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL 
“BAREBOAT” 




The Mediterranean region is a smorgasbord of targets for terrorists with 
maritime expertise. So, what explains the relative paucity of maritime terrorist 
attacks to date? The answer is complex, but to start with, terrorists are conserva-
tive by nature; they stay with what works. The abundance of European targets 
ashore—coupled with the poor track record of law enforcement—has focused 
the attention of most attackers on operations they can launch from hotel rooms 
and apartments. By contrast, maritime expertise is outside the normal skill set 
of even the most successful terrorist organization; anything that increases the 
already high risk of failure will be avoided. Moreover, maritime targets are often 
remote, lying beyond the effective range of the live media coverage that has 
become de rigueur for modern terrorism. There are, however, circumstances that 
may drive certain terrorist organizations to consider making maritime attacks a 
regular option, especially in the Mediterranean region.  
First of all, successful maritime attacks in other regions provide “best practices” 
that can be duplicated elsewhere with some confidence. The wildly successful 
Mumbai attacks taught violent extremists everywhere that using the sea for 
infiltration is not really very difficult, especially for suicide missions. Properly 
trained terrorists wishing to attack cities and critical infrastructure along the 
Mediterranean coast can have it both ways: mayhem and live coverage.22 A 
second factor that could drive terrorists toward the sea is the improved coun-
terterrorism measures now being applied by law enforcement authorities across 
Europe. The re-imposition of national border controls, as well as heightened 
scrutiny of migrants and refugees, has made traditional targeting more difficult. 
Terrorists, like lightning, take the path of least resistance. As European nations 
become more successful at blunting continental attacks, that path could become 
increasingly maritime.
One additional reason to expect maritime attacks is the emerging competition in 
brutality between al Qaeda and ISIS, now most prevalent in Africa.23 Maritime 
attacks, especially against crowds and critical infrastructure, could raise the 
bar in a recruiting contest between the two organizations, which have suffered 
significant operational setbacks. The most extreme outcome would be the use 
of a nuclear weapon or radiological device (a “dirty bomb”), which would be 
delivered most easily from the high seas. European authorities must not allow 
the intense focus on continental security to blind them to what may be in store 
for the maritime realm. History teaches us that terrorist organizations become 
most violent and particularly creative as they begin to feel that they are losing.
Target Analysis 
Let us assume that terrorist operatives acting for al Qaeda or ISIS, or some other 
group not yet on Europe’s radar, have decided to add maritime attacks in southern 
Europe to their operational portfolios. How would they determine which targets 
to select? Despite the abundance of targets, terrorist planners would want to 
maximize their return on financial and political investments. Even if terrorists 
are well-resourced, the specter of failure haunts them. In a competition for the 
allegiance of the young and the zealous, operational success must build upon op-
erational success, while governments must be made to look weak and ineffective. 
In a bleed-to-bankruptcy strategic competition, terrorists can easily lose, because 
states, especially when they act together, have an enormous resource advantage. 
TERRORISTS WISHING 
TO ATTACK CITIES 
ALONG THE COAST 
CAN HAVE IT BOTH 
WAYS: MAYHEM AND 
LIVE COVERAGE.  
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To engineer a successful long-term campaign, any terrorist organization would 
have to use some kind of target analysis process. 
What might the target analysis process for a terrorist organization look like? 
One way to imagine this would be to examine the process known as CARVER 
(criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability), 
used by US SOF units. This acronym, now woven into the mentality of trained 
American saboteurs, breaks down into a series of judgments based on certain 
assessment criteria and the assignment of raw scores.24 For terrorists, the same 
general methodology, modified for very different strategic objectives, would 
seem to offer an effective guide. With the benefit of experience—and some stra-
tegic imagination—the author has developed a putative terrorist target analysis 
model. Called CARVES, this tool is based on a list of assessment criteria similar 
to, but not the same as, the US SOF model.25  
Criticality. From a terrorist perspective, the criticality of a target to the infra-
structure system that serves people is significant but not crucial. In wartime, 
conventional forces would target such a system to deny the enemy some military 
advantage, but terrorists would be more interested in spreading fear through the 
population, and even a short-term blackout would accomplish that.
Accessibility. With their limited resources, terrorists must consider accessibility 
more than conventional armies need to. A government might be able to render 
a target so difficult to approach that terrorists decide to strike somewhere else—
and there are always plenty of other targets.
Resilience. In the context of modern terrorism, “resilience” has come to mean 
more than just the time it takes to get a system back online. The term also 
assesses the time it takes for the people themselves to recover. Terrorists would 
consider both aspects of resilience, but the latter might dominate.  
Vulnerability. Assuming terrorists can gain access to the target, vulnerability 
measures the ease with which the critical node(s) in a system can be taken out. 
Often a target will be vulnerable but inaccessible, or it can be accessible but 
largely invulnerable to destruction. Terrorists thrive on vulnerability; therefore, 
governments must work to reduce it for likely targets. 
Effects. Terrorist attacks are the ultimate “effects-based operations.”26 Terrorists 
want to create widespread public fear, and that fear can be amplified by random 
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acts of violence—even when the odds suggest there is little danger to individual 
citizens. Therefore, this assessment criterion should be one of the most impor-
tant considerations in the terrorist target analysis process.
Symbolism. The target analysis process used by terrorists would have to include 
an evaluation of the potential target’s symbolic value. Political statements are 
strengthened through symbolism, but how important is symbolic value relative 
to the other assessment criteria? That will depend on the threat group’s strategic 
objectives.27
One application of the CARVES assessment criteria is found in table 1. This 
depiction is a starting point from which to calculate the “attractiveness” of 
generic maritime targets to a known threat group. Specific targets can be 
substituted as more is known about terrorist intent, motivation, and methods. 
Panels of experts would have to be commissioned to adapt the table for a 
particular group and then to propose raw scores for each assessment criterion. 
The different weighting factors assigned to each criterion indicate that not all 
the assessment criteria have the same importance. The weighting factors sug-
gested in table 1 can be modified according to the collective views of a panel 
of experts, but they are a good place to begin. Multiplying raw scores (1–10) 
by weighting factors (held constant for each assessment criterion) produces 
total scores that can be rank-ordered. The example shown in table 1 lists 10 
generic Mediterranean targets to analyze in this way.28 
The notional values in this example tell us quite a bit about the experts who 
assigned them as well as the targets themselves. For instance, the consensus ap-
pears to be that crowds on beaches, LNG terminals, and other industrial plants 
ashore pose the greatest defensive challenges. The experts were clearly worried 
about passenger ferries. A more thorough examination illustrates the two prime 
sources of value for our analytical method: better resource 
distribution and deep thinking about what terrorists might be 
planning. The table (and the collective judgment it represents) 
is “possibilistic” rather than simply probabilistic, injecting expe-
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Terrorists seeking tactical success must adhere to a planning cycle that calls for 
evaluating generic targets before analyzing specific ones. We should suppose that 
specific targets will be analyzed in similar fashion. Using the table for specific 
maritime targets in and along the Mediterranean Sea would indicate where gov-
ernments—individually or collectively—might apply more (or fewer) resources 
and the highest (or lowest) levels of security.29 No government can protect all 
potential targets simultaneously. Some system of “strategic triage” is needed to 
distribute precious resources in the defense against active terrorist threats. The 
suggested CARVES analytical process encourages responsible officials to think 
like the terrorists they believe might target them, and enables them to develop 
the most effective and efficient defensive strategies.30  
Tactics and Tradecraft 
How might terrorists actually use the information gleaned from such an ana-
lytical process?31 Assuming the attackers can generate the capability to operate in 
a maritime environment—or contract their operations to pirates and smugglers 
who already have it—they have a rich menu from which to choose, first gener-
ally and then specifically, as shown in table 1. Using table 1 as a guide, we can 
list some of the targets terrorists might select to achieve their basic objectives of 
causing the most harm and creating widespread fear on Europe’s southern fringe.
Oil and gas tanker. Tankers carrying liquid or gas hydrocarbons to and from 
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1. Confirm list of generic Mediterranean targets 
2. Assign/confirm weighting factors (×3, etc)
3. Assign raw scores
4. Multiply weighting factors times raw scores
5. Total each line-item
6. Compare total scores
7. List targets in order of attractiveness to specific terrorist organization
8. Repeat the process for specific Mediterranean targets
9. Use data generated to plan defensive strategies
Table 1: CARVES Table
Maritime Targets for Mediterranean Sea Region
Spring 2017
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boats laden with explosives. Hijacked tankers could also be used to ram pier 
facilities, shoreside power plants, and coastal developments. 
Offshore platform. Offshore energy platforms in the Mediterranean are preva-
lent, exposed, and increasing in number. Terrorists could easily approach these 
structures with recreational craft rented from local marinas. The platforms could 
be damaged with standoff weapons or by positioning non-threatening–looking 
boats loaded with explosives underneath the structure.
LNG terminal. Liquefied natural gas is transported between export termi-
nals, where the gas is converted into liquid, and import terminals, where it is 
converted back into a gas. Both ends of this trade are vulnerable to standoff 
weapons, but the real threat would be ramming a ship—perhaps even an LNG 
tanker—into the facilities.
Passenger ferry. Terrorists using the refugee flow as a “cover for status” can easily 
board oceangoing ferries that connect Greek and Italian islands to mainland 
Europe. If they are able to smuggle explosives aboard or wear suicide vests, it 
would be possible for them to sink the ferries and kill large numbers of innocent 
people. Such an attack could be timed to coincide with leaving or arriving in a 
crowded port.
Cruise ship. The Mediterranean Sea is full of cruise ships treating tourists to 
the sights and pleasures of Western civilization. Although difficult to sink, they 
offer a symbolic target that—for those skillful enough to climb aboard from an 
assaulting boat—could be used as a mass killing field. After that, the ship could 
be used as a weapon to ram into another target.
Cargo ship in port. There are ships filled with hazardous cargoes in most 
European ports. Terrorists could gain access to these ports and ships unnoticed 
from small boats or by embedding themselves into shipping containers with 
false walls to hide them. Cyber systems can also be hacked to enable terrorists 
to control—and thereby smuggle—large amounts of explosive into proximity 
with volatile materials, causing widespread damage. Sinking a ship at the pier or 
mouth of a small harbor could block port operations for some time.
Cargo ship underway. Non-tanker cargo ships at sea, particularly those in 
restricted waters, could be hijacked by terrorists trained in ship-boarding tech-
niques, similar to the Somali pirates who ply the Gulf of Aden. In fact, increased 
levels of security on tankers and other high-value targets might mean that 
ordinary cargo ships would become more vulnerable. If terrorists do not wish to 
develop such capabilities, they could contract the work to maritime criminals or 
conduct joint operations. Once seized, any ship can also be used as a weapon.   
Industrial plant ashore. Once inside a port facility, terrorists could sabotage oil 
and gas storage tanks, oil refineries and petrochemical plants, electricity genera-
tion and distribution facilities, and cargo handling systems. The abundance of 
critical infrastructure in port districts would be attractive to terrorists bent on 
causing maximum disruption but not on killing large numbers of people.
Crowds ashore. Beaches and coastal resorts expose large numbers of vacationing 
Europeans to mass casualty attacks by terrorists coming from over the horizon. 
THE HIJACKED VESSEL, 
NOW RIGGED AS 
A FLOATING BOMB, 
ENTERS THE HARBOR 
AND RAMS A TANKER. 
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No government has enough resources to protect all these 
crowds all the time, as the truck attack in Nice, France, so 
brutally demonstrated.32 Terrorists could use sailing yachts, 
motorboats, or jet skis as covers for status and action, 
allowing them to get close to their targets without raising 
alarm. In position, terrorists could rake crowded beaches 
with gunfire and grenades without even coming ashore. 
NATO warship underway. Warships from the NATO 
Alliance are now being deployed to interdict human smug-
glers in the narrow passages between mainland Turkey and 
the closer Greek islands.33 These restricted waters render 
such oceangoing ships vulnerable to ramming attacks from 
fast boats rigged with explosives. With the reemergence 
of smuggling in the central region, NATO warships will 
redeploy and be exposed to such attacks around the 
Italian islands and Malta as well.34
With a surfeit of terrorist targets ashore, 
accessible by land and air routes, many 
would say that maritime terrorism is a 
low-probability event. But European 
governments do not have the luxury of 
planning for only the most likely sce-
narios; they must prepare for that which 
exposes the largest number of people to 
the highest risk—even if those outcomes 
are unlikely. They must think beyond 
what is probable and examine what is 
possible. Security officials would do well 
to “rehearse the future” by developing a series of planning 
scenarios based on feasible acts of maritime terrorism in 
the Mediterranean.35 The following four scenarios might 
be the beginning of a strategic conversation regarding 
some of the most devastating contingencies imaginable.
Scenario 1. Despite operational setbacks, ISIS maintains 
its “beachhead” in and around Sirte, Libya. Increased pres-
sure on human smugglers in the Aegean Sea has created 
a second wave of smuggling across the central Mediter-
ranean, and ISIS moves to control this lucrative enterprise. 
The group places a four-person team of operatives into 
the immigrant stream, posing as refugees from Syria. 
Unnoticed, they are carrying explosives in their luggage. 
At the other end of the transit near the Italian island of 
Lampedusa, two humanitarian relief vessels approach the 
rubber boat filled with refugees to offload them safely. 
The terrorists detonate their explosives, killing almost 100 
refugees and rescuers.36
Scenario 2. The refugee agreement between the European 
Union and Turkey has broken down. Syrian refugees have 
resumed boat crossings to Kos, despite the overcrowded 
refugee camps there. Two ISIS fighters have arrived on the 
island, using the renewed Syrian refugee flow as cover. 
Partisans from ISIS, having already infiltrated Kos on a 
remote beach under cover of darkness using their own 
rubber boat, meet clandestinely with the fighters, passing 
them clothing with explosives sewn into the material. 
The terrorists ride the ferry west. As the vessel approaches 
the pier in Piraeus, passengers line up to disembark. The 
bombers detonate themselves, one in the back of the 
crowd and one in the front. More than 50 passengers and 
crew are killed, with many more injured.   
Scenario 3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 
terrorists hijack a harbor tugboat just off the Moroccan 
city of Tangier, killing the crew. After dark, the tugboat 
makes a rendezvous with several explosive-laden rubber 
boats at a remote beach down the coast. The explosives are 
transferred to the tug before it crosses 
the Strait of Gibraltar. The hijacked 
vessel, now rigged as a floating bomb, 
enters the harbor of Gibraltar and 
rams a Maltese-flagged tanker filled 
with crude oil, killing the terrorists and 
several members of the tanker crew. 
Thick, black smoke from the resulting 
fire persists for several days as the world 
watches. Having demonstrated what it 
can do, AQIM threatens to attack other 
ships in the area. 
Scenario 4. Working from a hijacked Turkish fishing 
vessel, terrorists acting on behalf of ISIS climb aboard a 
gas platform operated by the American company Noble 
Energy in the “Leviathan” exploration block off the coast 
of Cyprus. After killing everyone on the rig, they attach 
explosives to the underside of the platform, set timers, 
and steam away toward the nearby Syrian coast. A large 
explosion destroys the rig, but enough of the structure 
remains above the surface to burn in full view of airborne 
media for many days. A steady stream of natural gas 
condensate is leaking from the wellhead, fouling the clear 
waters of the Eastern Mediterranean and threatening area 
beaches.37     
Conclusion
While European authorities are focused on protecting in-
land cities, maritime targets may become more attractive 
to terrorists who had initially avoided them. Even though 
maritime attacks are low-probability events—at least for 
now—such actions can bring very serious consequences. 
ONE SUCCESSFUL 






One successful maritime attack in the Mediterranean region could establish a trend toward the kinds of attacks discussed 
here. The menu for maritime terrorism has expanded; terrorist exploitation of this target set is simply a matter of time. 
European governments, working with their counterparts in southern and eastern Mediterranean states, can avoid the worst 
outcomes by developing three interlocking lines of strategic effort: defense, offense, and prevention.  
Defensive strategies begin with the risk assessment process previously discussed, but resources allocated for defense have 
to be balanced with those allocated for the other two strategies. Offensive strategies require assets to “find, fix, and finish” 
terrorists who wish to attack governments, while preventive strategies oblige governments to diminish, and perhaps elimi-
nate, the root causes of terrorism. Unless all three strategies are pursued together, terrorists will continue to score tactical 
successes against the governments that oppose them. Governments—especially when they act together—have enormous 
advantages over terrorist organizations. Consequently, creative terrorists (using a new form of “divide and conquer”) work 
to exploit the political divisions that obstruct national and regional cooperation. The exodus of refugees from the Middle 
East and North Africa into Europe may be the best example of this. 
The Mediterranean Sea and its periphery offer the most natural circumstances for regional cohesion found anywhere in 
the world. European governments should take the lead in strengthening that cohesion by promoting the collective pursuit 
of Mediterranean maritime security. Together, all 20 governments, including those now at war with themselves, must 
identify and extinguish the root causes of terrorism in the region. At the same time, they must continuously defend against 
the possibility of maritime attacks, pre-emptively neutralize the forces that threaten them, and maintain a high level of 
readiness to deal with the consequences of maritime terrorism that they cannot prevent. The sea itself is what united this 
region; perhaps securing the sea can bring it back together. v
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Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban 
Guerrilla (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).
10 United States Coast Guard, National Response Team, On Scene 
Coordinator Report: Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (Washington, 
D.C.: US Department of Homeland Security, September 2011). 
James Petroni presents a full discussion of this topic in “Managing 
Maritime Incidents,” in Shemella, Global Responses to Maritime 
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ferrylines.com/operators/europe-south
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Langewiesche, The Outlaw Sea: A World of Freedom, Chaos, and 
Crime (New York: North Point Press, 2004), 127–95. For more 
on the Sewol tragedy, see Steven Borowiec, “Pain and Anger in 
South Korea Two Years after the Sewol Ferry Tragedy,” Los Angeles 
Times, 15 April 2016: http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-
south-korea-ferry-20160415-story.html
16 For a current listing of LNG gasification and regasification 
facilities worldwide (operating, planned, and proposed), see 
http://www.globallnginfo.com/world%20lng%20plants%20
&%20terminals.pdf
17 At least one terrorist killed 38 tourists on a Tunisian beach in June 
2015. See Matthew Weaver, “Tunisia Beach Attack: Witnesses 
Say More Than One Gunman Involved,” Guardian, 30 June 2015: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/30/tunisia-beach-
attack-sousse-witnesses-say-more-than-one-gunman-involved
18 For an extended discussion, see John Green, “Welfare of 
Seafarers Is Important to Security,” Financial Times, 12 
February 2016: https://www.ft.com/content/9f61718e-
ce8f-11e5-831d-09f7778e7377 ; Sam Jones, “Europe’s 
Ports Vulnerable as Ships Sail without Oversight,” 
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Malaka Chandradasa, “Learning from Our Enemies: Sri Lankan 
Naval Special Warfare against the Sea Tigers,” CTX 2, no. 2 (May 
2012): https://globalecco.org/learning-from-our-enemies-sri-
lankan-naval-special-warfare-against-the-sea-tigers
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world-middle-east-33557180
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to the United States,” FDD’s Long War Journal, 29 April 2015: 
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/04/terrorism-in-
africa-the-imminent-threat-to-the-united-states.php
24 For a complete description of the Special Forces target analysis 
model, see Headquarters, Department of the Army, Special Forces 
Intelligence and Electronic Warfare and Operations, FM 34-36 
(Washington, D.C.: HQ, Department of the Army, 1991), 
Appendix D: https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm34-36/toc.htm 
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US model does not adjust for this, the CARVES model assigns 
“weighting factors” to each criterion, adding a degree of precision 
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29 A good example of what happens when government planners 
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controlled Vemork heavy water plant in 1943. For an account of 
the raid and a gripping lesson in target analysis, see Neal Bascomb, 
The Winter Fortress: The Epic Mission to Sabotage Hitler’s Atomic 
Bomb (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2016).
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with a variety of experience and perspectives, can be convened to 
lay the foundation for defensive strategies.
31 Many terrorist operatives, especially from the major threat 
groups, are more than just tacticians; they are also spies. With this 
new identity, they must practice what intelligence agencies call 
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recruit new members, conduct business for needed income, survey 
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32 French president François Hollande stated that even the tightest 
security measures could not have stopped the attack in Nice. He 
explained that Bastille Day has symbolic value for the enemies of 
freedom. See Alissa J. Rubin et al., “France Says Truck Attacker 
Was Tunisian Native with Record of Petty Crime,” New York 
Times, 15 July 2016: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/16/
world/europe/attack-nice-bastille-day.html  
33 Where they are not deliberately deployed, warships are bound 
by international law to render assistance to any refugees they 
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34 Terrorist attacks on warships underway are not unprecedented. 
Sri Lankan navy ships were attacked repeatedly by the Sea Tigers’ 
“swarms” of small boats.  
35 For a genuinely readable guide to scenario planning, see Peter 
Schwartz, The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an 
Uncertain World (New York: Random House, 1996).
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Given the recent proliferation of affordable and user-friendly 
small unmanned aircraft systems (sUASs, or “drones”) in the commercial 
marketplace, security professionals around the globe are grappling with how 
to safely, efficiently, and legally protect critical infrastructure sites from misuse 
of this emerging technology. While much attention has been afforded to the 
dangers drones pose to aircraft, most public research has overlooked sensitive 
facilities such as nuclear power plants, electrical power stations, and major 
ground transportation hubs. Given the recent use of weaponized sUASs in Syria 
and Iraq, it is imperative that both military and civilian security professionals 
have the tools necessary to combat this developing threat. To better illustrate 
the risks associated with commercially available drones and the danger they 
pose to infrastructure security, this article uses a major port in the United States 
(given the pseudonym Port of Opal City to protect existing security policies 
and procedures) as the case study for a comprehensive severity, probability, and 
exposure (SPE) risk analysis. 
Under current US law, an aircraft is defined as “any contrivance invented, used, or 
designed to navigate, or fly in, the air.”1 Building on this definition, an unmanned 
aircraft (UA) is legally defined as “any aircraft that is operated without the 
possibility of direct human intervention from within or on the aircraft,” while 
an unmanned aircraft system (UAS) is both a UA and its “associated elements, 
including communication links and the components that control the unmanned 
aircraft, that are required for the pilot in command to operate safely and ef-
ficiently in the national airspace system.”2 It is important to note that the focus 
of this article is on small UAs that weigh less than 55 pounds.3 While there is no 
globally recognized regulatory definition for the term drone, this popular term is 
commonly used to mean an sUAS, and this article uses both words interchange-
ably. Although this article uses a US port and the US legal environment for its 
analysis, its general methodology and findings are widely applicable to similar 
facilities in other countries. The article’s recommendations can likewise be modi-
fied to fit other social and legal situations.
Commercially Available Rotary Wing SUASs
Tables 1 through 6 list the current top 10 commercially available rotary wing 
drones by the following criteria (all prices are in US dollars): (1) lowest cost, 
(2) highest cost, (3) longest flight time (in minutes), (4) longest operating range 
(in feet), (5) largest payload capacity (in pounds), and (6) maximum flying speed 
(in miles per hour).4 Rotary-wing sUASs exclusively marketed for military use are 
not included in this list. The Ehang 184, while marketed as a drone, is also not 
included in this list because it can potentially carry an operator inside the aircraft 
itself while airborne.5 Fixed-wing drones are not included in this analysis because 
of US buyers’ strong preference for rotary-wing drones.6 The purpose of this list 
is to provide the reader with a sense of the capabilities of commercially available 
drones. These lists are accurate as of June 2016 and are liable to change. 
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1 H101 Floureon 4 $15.00 7 0.7 N/A Unknown 65 Unknown
2 V911S Wltoys 4 $15.00 6 0.02 N/A Unknown 98 Unknown
3 FX-10 Mini Floureon 4 $15.00 6 0.02 N/A Unknown 82 Unknown
4 W609 HJ 6 $15.00 5 0.03 N/A Unknown 164 Unknown
5 X165 XinLin 4 $16.00 5 0.03 N/A Unknown 72 Unknown
6 L6058 Lishtoys 4 $17.00 8 0.01 N/A Unknown 98 Unknown
7 X165 XinLin 4 $18.00 5 0.03 N/A Unknown 72 Unknown
8 H8 Mini JJRC 4 $20.00 5 0.4 N/A Unknown 492 Unknown
9 Rc Mini Udi 4 $20.00 5 0.02 N/A Unknown 98 Unknown






















1 Titan XactSense 8 $120,000 30 18 50 180 52,805 Unknown
2 MAX 8 XactSense 8 $65,000 25 5 20 397 Unknown Unknown
3 F100 AEE 4 $58,000 70 13.2 5.51 4,921 32,808 61
4 cyberQuad Sci.Aero 4 $37,000 25 3.7 1.76 Unknown 1,640 37
5 F50 AEE 4 $37,000 40 4.4 Unknown 2,953 65,617 11




8 $35,360 30 5.5 5.51 Unknown 6,561 37
7 Multirotor 
















6 $25,420 20 6 5.07 Unknown 9,843 18
10 Martin 
Indago






















1 Pocketflyer CyPhy 
Works Inc.
6 Unknown 120 0.20 N/A Unknown 76 Unknown
2 MD4-1000 Microdrones 4 $2,000 88 5.80 2.65 3,281 1,640 27
3 F100 AEE 4 $58,000 70 13.20 5.51 4,921 32,808 61
4 EF 44 “Atlas” Allied 
Drones
4 $15,000 60 Unknown 4.41 Unknown Unknown Unknown
5 QR X800 Walkera 4 $2,700 60 8.60 Unknown Unknown 6,562 Unknown
6 Fotokite Pro Fotokite 4 $10,000 60 1.30 Unknown Unknown 65 Unknown
7 Vader X4 SteadiDrone 4 $19,995 50 8.40 9.48 13,123 4,921 44.7
8 Altura 
Zenith ATX8
Aerialtronics 8 $2,000 45 7.70 6.39 Unknown 3,281 44.7
9 HX3 Yuneec 
Flying Eyes





8 $20,000 45 15.00 15 Unknown 65,617 30





























6 $25,000 25 35.1 22.49 20,013 Unknown 44.7
3 MAX 8 XactSense 8 $65,000 25 5.00 20 396 Unknown Unknown
4 Infinity 9Pro 
Octocopter
TurboAce 8 $15,098 15 15.00 20 Unknown 6,335 Unknown
5 QU4D X SteadiDrone 4 $13,999 20 7.90 17.64 Unknown Unknown Unknown
6 AIR8 Airborne 
Robotics





8 $20,000 45 15.00 15 Unknown 65,617 30
8 SkyJib-8 
Ti-QR
Aeronavics 8 $17,945 15 Unknown 11.02 Unknown 9,842 Unknown
9 Thor X4 Aerial 
Technology 
International
8 $14,150 15 34.2 10 Unknown Unknown 66
10 SkyJib-X4 
Ti-QR
Aeronavics 8 $15,592 20 Unknown 7.72 Unknown 9,842 49






















1 F100 AEE 4 $58,000 70 13.2 5.51 4,921 32,808 61
2 Matrice 100 DJI 4 $3,300 40 5.2 2.2 Unknown 16,404 49.2
3 Kasper North 
American
4 $720 30 1.4 0.5 Unknown 1,969 48.9
4 Vader X4 SteadiDrone 4 $19,995 50 8.4 9.48 13,123 4,921 45
5 Altura 
Zenith ATX8
Aerialtronics 8 $2,000 45 7.7 6.39 Unknown 3,281 45
6 Indago Lockheed 
Martin
4 $25,000 45 4.9 0.44 499 6,562 45
7 Sky Flytrex 4 $650 30 2.8 4.41 Unknown 36,089 45





8 $28,260 30 5.5 5.51 Unknown 6,562 37




8 $35,360 30 5.5 5.51 Unknown 6,561 37





















1 AgBOT Aerial 
Technology 
International





8 $20,000 45 15 15 Unknown 65,617 30
3 F50 AEE 4 $37,000 40 4.4 Unknown 2,953 65,617 11
4 Titan XactSense 8 $120,000 30 18 50 180 52,805 Unknown





Skyhawk 6 $1,600 25 4 2.65 984 32,808 23.4
7 F100 AEE 4 $58,000 70 13.2 5.51 4,921 32,808 61
8 350 QX2 AP 
Combo
Blade 4 $900 15 2.2 0.55 Unknown 16,404 Unknown
9 Phantom 4 DJI 4 $1,400 28 3 1.02 19,685.04 16,404 44.7
10 Matrice 100 DJI 4 $3,300 40 5.2 2.2 Unknown 16,404 49.2
LONGEST OPERATING DISTANCE (Feet [ft.])
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Severity, Probability, and Exposure Risk Analysis 
Methodology
Quantifying the risk of an sUAS attack is an especially tedious task, given the 
variety of harmful ways in which a drone may be deployed. Commercially avail-
able sUASs are capable of circumnavigating traditional physical security measures 
and have the capacity to deliver payloads designed to cause either physical or 
cybernetic damage. The SPE risk analysis is a method of objectively assessing risk 
that has been used by the US Coast Guard. The simple methodology involves 
assigning values to a set of pre-defined criteria. For the purposes of this case 
study, the first area of focus, severity, evaluates the degree to which a successful 
sUAS attack on the Port of Opal City’s infrastructure, personnel, and/or 
trade-related vehicles and vessels will affect the local, state, and national 
economies. The probability component analyzes drone sales in the 
United States and reported incidents of drone misuse in other US ports, 
noting some historical incidents of nefarious drone use worldwide. The final 
component, exposure, classifies targets in the Port of Opal City and discusses 
pre-existing security policies that the port has in place.
The values allocated to each SPE variable are multiplied together to generate a final 
risk value, which is then compared against the Coast Guard’s pre-determined risk 
guidance index to determine the port’s degree of vulnerability to attack. This 
study uses objective benchmarks tailored to the Port of Opal City in place of 
the Coast Guard’s original SPE standards, a methodology that may similarly be 
adapted for use at any major critical infrastructure site, provided enough data is 
publicly available to establish both comparative and objective benchmarks for 
a comprehensive review. The language ascribed to each value specifically for the 
Port of Opal City appears in table 7 below.
Severity Scale
1 No change in port operations
2 Temporary shutdown of one port pier for less than one hour
3 Shutdown of one port pier for more than one hour but less than 24 
hours
4 Shutdown of two or more port piers for more than one hour but less 
than 24 hours
5 Shutdown of two or more port piers exceeding 24 hours
Probability Scale
1 0% –20% chance of a drone attack or accidental drone-related incident, 
which would negatively affect port infrastructure, personnel, and/or trade-
related vessels/vehicles
2 21% – 40% chance of such a drone-related incident
3 41% – 60% chance of such a drone-related incident
4 61% – 80% chance of such a drone-related incident
5 81% –100% chance of such a drone-related incident
Table 7: Criteria and Values for Severity, Probability, Exposure, and Risk of a Drone 




1 Port security uses effective anti-UAS countermeasures.  
Port precautions exceed those implemented at similar US ports.
2 Port security does not use anti-UAS countermeasures.  
Port precautions exceed those implemented at similar US ports.
3 Port security does not use anti-UAS countermeasures.  
Port precautions mirror those implemented at similar US ports.
4 Port security does not use anti-UAS countermeasures.  
Port security precautions fall below those implemented at similar US 
ports.
Risk Values* Degree of Risk Guidance
80 –100 Very High Discontinue, Stop
60 –79 High Correct Immediately
40 –59 Substantial Correction Required
20 –39 Possible Attention Needed
1–19 Slight Possibility Acceptable
*Risk value = severity × probability × exposure
Port of Opal City
As mentioned earlier, the Port of Opal City is a pseudonym for the actual US 
seaport on which this SPE risk analysis was originally based. While key details 
have been removed or altered to obscure the port’s true identity and uphold the 
integrity of specific security protocols, the resulting scores of the SPE risk analysis 
have not been altered in any way. These scores appear at the end of each SPE 
component evaluation. 
The Port of Opal City processes over five million 20-foot container units annu-
ally and generates billions of dollars in annual trade revenue. Beyond indirectly 
generating millions of dollars for local businesses that service port customers, 
the harbor provides well over 200,000 jobs for the region as a whole. The port 
contracts with the local police department to provide security and also has a 
separate security patrol dedicated to monitoring port operations. Each of its 
12 piers is leased to a private company, which in turn employs its own private 
facility security. The port authority (the port’s management body) actively 
maintains relationships with both federal law enforcement agencies and 
regional emergency management agencies. The port has not deployed 
any sUAS countermeasures and currently does not permit any drone 
operations within the facility due to security concerns. Both the local 
police force and the harbor-specific police force currently abide by 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) guidance to not interfere 
directly with potentially illegal drone operations at the port but instead to 
report such incidents to the region’s FAA office.7 
Severity
The US Coast Guard defines severity as “an event’s potential consequences 
measured in terms of degree of damage, injury, or impact on a mission.”8 To 
complement this definition, this section focuses on the likely economic effects 
that a drone attack on the Port of Opal City would have at the local, state, and 
THE PORT PROCESSES 
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national levels. While there has never been a known drone 
attack on a US port, the documented effects of national 
disasters, union strikes, and deliberate or accidental 
damage to US port infrastructure can serve to illustrate 
how a kinetic or cybernetic drone assault could have wide-
reaching economic ramifications. 
It is important to consider that even temporary disrup-
tions in port operations are likely to cause extensive eco-
nomic damage to the community, region, and nation. A 
simulated biological attack or even excessive hindrance by 
drones could result in a work slowdown or even a strike by 
port labor. The California longshoremen’s strike of 2012, 
for example, resulted in supply chain disruptions that cost 
over $1 billion a day.9 Studies on such a strike occurring at 
the Ports of New York and New Jersey estimated losses of 
$110 million per week in economic output.10
A RAND report detailing the immediate ramifications of a 
hypothetical nuclear explosion in the Port of Long Beach 
stated that such an attack could cost the nation over $1 
trillion within 24 hours following 
the initial detonation.11 The report 
furthermore recognized that any 
chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear, or explosive attack upon a 
major US port would likely result in 
the immediate closure of nearby ports 
as a precautionary measure against 
any further attacks.12 The psycholog-
ical fear of a secondary attack coupled 
with even a temporary precautionary 
closure of other major US ports has 
the high potential to wreak economic 
havoc exceeding that of the projected 
$1 trillion loss.13 
While a drone carrying a full-scale nuclear weapon is 
highly unlikely for a number of reasons, the potential for a 
UA to deliver an explosive containing radioactive material 
is entirely possible. A well-orchestrated attack carried out 
by multiple sUASs on two or more ports using conven-
tional explosives might result in other precautionary port 
closures, magnifying the initial economic losses caused 
by the original attack. Given that a UA’s point of origin 
cannot always be traced, concerns over a follow-up assault 
by other drones could force port operations adjacent to 
the initial attack site to cease until local, state, and federal 
authorities decide that it is safe to resume normal opera-
tions. Even unintentional drone mishaps that involve 
port labor and result in a strike could cause a slowdown 
of port operations until temporary replacement workers 
were found. A well-timed, albeit minor, assault by a single 
drone has the potential to affect the economy not only at 
the regional level but also at the national level. Given this 
fact, a deliberate drone assault or even an accidental drone 
crash that damages critical port infrastructure has the 
potential to shut down or delay port operations for two 
port piers for more than one hour but less than 24 hours, 
at the very least.
Severity Score: 4 (of a possible 5; see table 7)
Probability
Given the relatively recent proliferation of commercial 
drones in the US marketplace, it is difficult to gauge the 
probability of a drone attack or accident on any American 
port. By combining the number of commercial drones 
presently in circulation in the United States with pro-
jected sales figures for the near future to establish a base-
line, and comparing this figure with both drone incidents 
reported by the FAA and a sampling of reported drone 
incidents at US ports nationwide, it is 
possible to arrive at some estimates of 
probability. In addition, a brief over-
view of some historical nefarious uses 
of drones provide further context to 
the probability of an sUAS attack on a 
major port facility. 
At the present time, exact drone 
sales figures in the United States are 
not known, because the majority of 
sUAS manufacturers choose not to 
disclose them. Despite this lack of 
precise data, the FAA estimates that 
there are presently 1.9 million drones 
currently in circulation, with that 
number likely to rise to seven million units by the year 
2020.14 The FAA has also noted a sharp increase in the 
overall number of drone-related incidents or “close calls” 
in the United States over the past four years. Most of these 
incidents involve drones flying too close to commercial 
aircraft. In 2015, over 1,200 of these incident reports were 
filed, raising concerns among travelers.15 The Academy 
of Model Aeronautics has challenged the high number 
of reported incidents by stating that the FAA’s notion of 
“close calls” lacks any clear regulatory definition, and that 
many incidents include drones that were conducting legal 
airborne operations at the time.16
Presently, there is no public database listing domestic 
drone incidents at US ports. In an attempt to shed further 
light on this issue, the author contacted 59 US port 
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authorities and asked them to disclose how many or if any drone-related inci-
dents had occurred at their respective facilities between July 2014 and July 2016. 
Drone-related incidents were defined as unsanctioned drone activity above or on 
port property or the recovery of a crashed commercial drone on port property. 
The data compiled from this survey can be found in table 8. At the request of the 
port security officers contacted for this research, ports have been grouped by an-
nual cargo volume in short tons and are not identified by name. A distinction was 
made between those ports that had no recorded drone incidents and those that 
chose not to disclose the number of incidents (only 12 of the 59 port authorities 
contacted for the study were willing to share that information). There were fewer 
than five reported drone incidents at nearly all US ports over the past two years.
Commercially available drones have been used successfully in a variety of 
nefarious operations, ranging from surveillance of critical infrastructure sites 
to actual bomb attacks. The following incidents highlight how commercially 
available drones have the potential to be used as weapons and for surveillance 
activities and smuggling operations.
 ¡ An online video published by ISIS showed footage captured from a drone 
over the Baji oil refinery in Iraq.17 It is believed that the footage was 
used to assist ISIS commanders in carrying out a later attack on the same 
facility in April 2015.18
 ¡ There have been numerous reports of drones being used to smuggle 
illegal drugs across the US-Mexico border. The first seizure of these 
drug-carrying drones occurred in August 2015, when US Border Patrol 
agents seized a drone loaded with 28 pounds of heroin.19 The US Drug 
Enforcement Agency estimates that over 150 drone drug trafficking trips 
were made in 2012 alone.20
 ¡ In October 2014, during a police interview, El Mehdi Semlali Fathi 
discussed his plans to carry out attacks on an unnamed US university 
and federal building by adding an explosive payload to commercially 
available drones.21
 ¡ In October 2016, Kurdish fighters shot down an ISIS surveillance 
drone, which exploded as they were inspecting the wreckage. This was 



















Number of Ports 
which Reported 
6 or More Drone 
Incidents
Number of Ports 
which chose not to 
Disclose Number of 
Drone Incidents
200,000,000+ 2 − − − 2
199,999,999− 
100,000,000
1 − − − 1
99,999,999− 
50,000,000
10 − 3 − 7
49,99,999− 
25,000,000
12 1 − 1 10
25,000,000− 
1,000,000
34 6 1 − 27
Table 8. Publicly Disclosed Drone Incidents at US Ports, July 2014–July 2016
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 ¡ In April 2015, a rotary wing drone carrying 100 grams of “low-level radio-
active sand” landed on the roof of the Japanese prime minister’s office in 
what was later determined to be an act of protest by a private citizen.23
Coupling the FAA’s estimation of 1.9 million privately owned drones currently 
in the United States with its 1,200 reported “close calls” involving drones, the 
current threat of a drone attack on the Port of Opal City would appear to be 
relatively low. Given the FAA’s projection of dramatically increasing drone sales 
in the next four years, however, the likelihood of either a deliberate or accidental 
drone incident at the Port of Opal City is bound to increase significantly in 
the near future.24 The economic significance of the Port of Opal City and its 
lack of deployed drone countermeasures (see table 7: Exposure) mean that the 
probability that the port will be the target of a drone attack or the victim of an 
accidental drone crash in the near future is relatively high and liable to increase 
in the coming years.
Probability Score: 4 (of a possible 5; see table 7)
Exposure
The preceding “Severity” and “Probability” sections respectively addressed 
the potential economic implications of port supply chain disruptions and the 
likelihood of drone attacks in the future. This section, “Exposure,” evaluates 
port-specific targets and precautions the Port of Opal City has taken in order 
to mitigate the risk of a damaging sUAS attack or accident. The Port of Opal 
City has several types of possible targets, both structural and human, that could 
attract an assailant. The primary mobile targets of a potential drone assault are 
ships, trucks, cars, trains, and helicopters. While the type of cargo it carries may 
play an important role in determining whether a particular mobile target is 
chosen, officials should consider the target’s secondary factors of strategic and 
social significance when evaluating possible security measures. An assault on 
a large passenger ship, for instance, could have significant effects on the entire 
cruise industry by diminishing such economic activity as future cruise sales, ship 
purchases, port facility usage, and employment.
The infrastructure critical to most port operations, such as cranes, fuel pumping 
stations, conveyers, rail lines, and buildings where personnel are located, could 
potentially be immobile targets for a drone attack. While multiple drones may 
be necessary to severely damage a ship, a single drone with an explosive payload 
could cause immeasurable harm to less-protected infrastructure sites. Piers that 
deal with the transportation of corrosive materials and fuel pumping stations 
that are uncovered and unprotected would be ideal targets for a single drone 
assault. The deliberate destruction or blocking of rail lines in and around port 
property could likewise slow the delivery of goods. 
It is important to keep in mind that not all drone attacks must be kinetic to 
cause large-scale damage. Structures that house sensitive information are at 
risk for remote cyber attacks and surveillance. Commercial drones have dem-
onstrated the ability to carry jamming devices for remote use on a cyber target 
with no adverse effects to the drone’s command and control systems.25 An sUAS 
could likewise be outfitted with penetration testing software or unconven-
tional surveillance devices to conduct remote cyber attacks on technological 
infrastructure. For example, a group of researchers at Ben-Gurion University in 
AGENTS SEIZED A 
DRONE LOADED WITH 
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Israel demonstrated that a drone outfitted with a photodiode sensor is capable 
of receiving proprietary data on compromised air-gapped computers via the 
system’s built-in LED lights.26
Both staff and private citizens within the Port of Opal City are potential targets 
for a drone attack. Unlike mobile and immobile targets, personnel warrant a 
separate classification because of their unique responsibility in guaranteeing 
that the port operates efficiently. While direct kinetic attacks on personnel are a 
possibility, the psychological ramifications of a drone assault may have far more 
devastating effects on port operations overall. Simulated biological attacks, such 
as a drone deliberately dropping any kind of white powder, are liable to result in 
the evacuation of personnel and the disruption of port operations. Even a drone 
carrying out port-sanctioned operations is liable to accidentally drop objects, 
which could result in injury or temporary suspension of port operations.
For this study, it is important to note that the port will be graded only on those 
security measures and procedures that are public knowledge. As mentioned 
earlier, the port has a vast array of traditional security measures presently at its 
disposal; one of the unique features of the maritime environment is its overlap-
ping levels of security. Each privately leased pier has its own private security 
system, which is managed by facility security officers. The Port of Opal City’s 
security sector maintains an active relationship with the state’s emergency 
services department, US Customs and Border Patrol, the Coast Guard, the 
Navy, Department of Homeland Security investigators, and the FBI. Despite the 
various security agencies assigned to guard the US maritime economy, however, 
the Port of Opal City and most other ports in the nation lack the capacity to 
legally acquire and deploy the technology necessary to defeat a hostile airborne 
UA. Given the port’s numerous targets, lack of sUAS-specific countermeasures, 
and operational vulnerabilities to cyberattacks, the port has a high degree of 
exposure to a potential drone attack. 
Exposure Score: 3 (of a possible 4; see table 7)
Risk Assessment
Risk Value = Severity × Probability × Exposure 
Risk Value = 4 × 4 × 3 
Risk Value = 48 (of a possible 100; see table 7)
Utilizing the SPE formula, the Port of Opal City is assigned a risk value of 
48. According to the Coast Guard’s Risk Value chart, this number shows that 
the port is at a “substantial” degree of risk of a drone attack and that the port 
authority should take measures to improve security (see table 7: Guidance). 
Policy Solutions and Available Countermeasures
The FAA’s definition of navigable airspace as “airspace at and above the minimum 
flight altitudes … including airspace needed for safe takeoff and landing” has 
generated much controversy in the wake of commercial drone use, given the 
lack of clear legal guidance on what constitutes “minimum flight altitudes.”27 
Presently, the FAA categorizes drones as aircraft, which makes it the only US 
government body with jurisdiction over sUAS use or misuse.28 The FAA has 
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released preliminary guidance for local law enforcement 
officers to follow, should they witness a possible violation 
of any sUAS regulations, but local police do not have any 
authority to stop airborne drone operations at this time. 
Their role is limited to interviewing witnesses, identifying 
any sUAS operator(s), recording the location of the alleged 
sUAS incident, and identifying nearby sensitive locations, 
events, and/or activities.
Nefarious sUAS activities are bound to occur in restricted 
airspace regardless of any federal laws. For this reason, 
both military and civilian facility security officers must be 
aware of all viable countermeasures at their disposal if they 
wish to mitigate the dangers of this emerging threat. In the 
United States, however, many of these countermeasures 
remain illegal and would require prior federal approval. 
Drone countermeasures tend to fall into one of two major 
categories: kinetic or cybernetic. A kinetic countermea-
sure involves disabling a targeted drone 
by physically damaging or immobilizing 
one or more components necessary 
to keep the drone aloft. Cybernetic 
countermeasures encompass a variety of 
tactics involving electronic manipulation 
of a drone’s communication/guidance 
system. The legal parameters sur-
rounding kinetic and cybernetic coun-
termeasures present their own unique 
challenges.
Kinetic Countermeasures
Falconry abatement is the use of specific kinds of birds 
of prey (e.g., falcons and buteos) to scare small migra-
tory birds away from airports in order to prevent the 
smaller birds from being sucked into airplane engines.29 
The Dutch National Police Force and French Air Force 
have been experimenting with using birds of prey to 
attack airborne drones, but this strategy has never been 
implemented in the United States.30 While the US federal 
government now allows states to issue falconry licenses 
in accordance with state laws as of 2014, some states still 
reserve the right to issue specialty licenses regarding the 
use of non-domestic animals and birds (species that are 
not traditionally raised for companionship or food) for 
commercial services.31 A drone abatement license could 
hypothetically be issued as long as a master falconer, in 
compliance with local, state, and federal animal welfare 
laws, took the necessary precautions to protect his or 
her birds from any damage that might be caused by sUAS 
rotors. If these conditions could be normalized, falconry 
drone abatement could become a reality not only for 
airports but also for major centers of economic commerce 
and critical infrastructure sites. 
Another kinetic drone countermeasure that is slowly 
making its way into the global marketplace is the 
launching of a projectile at a drone with the goal of 
either trapping it or knocking it out of the sky. Physically 
discharging a metal or rubber bullet or shell at a drone 
is not a legally valid option in the United States at this 
time.32 While shooting pressurized water from a fire hose 
may be another option for physically knocking a drone 
out of the sky, the time necessary to set up a pump and 
hose is not practical, given how quickly a drone incident 
may occur. Companies such as SkyWall have developed a 
shoulder-fired canister that traps a drone with a net and 
then deploys a parachute to slowly lower the ensnared 
drone to the ground.33 While SkyWall has not yet set a 
release date for this countermeasure, it has great potential 
for use in the United States because it 
minimizes the risk of injuring bystanders 
with falling debris. 
The most widely practiced drone 
countermeasure has been the use of 
“anti-drone” drones. These drones are 
manually operated and typically sport 
a large net below the drone’s airframe. 
If flown properly, these drones can be 
used to chase down and catch a targeted 
sUAS. This countermeasure has seen es-
pecially wide use in Tokyo, Japan, where 
the local government has established an 
anti-drone squad within the Tokyo police force.34 Other 
models of anti-drone drones include net-firing drones, but 
this technology is still in the experimental stage. 
Cybernetic Countermeasures
Cybernetic countermeasures can remove a drone from the 
sky while minimizing any potentially damaging physical 
fallout. Three primary cybernetic solutions are spoofing, 
hacking, and jamming. Spoofing deceives a drone’s control 
system into accepting commands from a communica-
tion signal that was not generated by the true pilot’s 
base station. The operator spoofing the targeted sUAS 
must have either prior knowledge of the exact wireless 
channel the drone is functioning on or the technological 
ability to independently determine that information.35 
Hacking a drone is, as the name implies, sending invasive 
computer code to the drone’s onboard flight controller 
or base station transponder and changing the guidance 
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programming to accept a different command signal or operate on a different set 
of flight protocols.36 To jam a drone, the countermeasure operator spams the 
drone’s radio frequency with incoherent “noise” that prevents the drone from 
communicating with the true operator’s base station. Most commercial drones 
have a built-in “safe mode,” which is designed to either keep the sUAS stationary 
in the air or fly it back to the site where it made its initial takeoff, should it lose 
contact with its base station. 
While all three cybernetic options have been proven to be among the safest 
solutions to mitigating unwarranted drone activity, some countries, including 
the United States, have cyber security laws that impose regulatory hurdles to 
such technology. Hacking, for instance, is generally illegal, although it is un-
clear whether using such technology as a drone deterrent would be unlawful.37 
Spoofing, while not explicitly illegal, may fall under the definition of hacking 
in certain instances. Furthermore, spoofing depends heavily on external factors 
such as the target drone pilot’s signal strength and the lack of any anti-spoofing 
hardware on the targeted drone.38 Jamming has been the most widely advertised 
solution to unwanted drones, but given its potential for abuse, the US Federal 
Communications Commission has prohibited the use of jamming technology by 
any non-federal agency.39 
Presently, the FAA is field-testing the British-made Anti-UAV (unmanned aerial 
vehicle) Defense System (AUDS).40 A ground-based system designed to detect, 
identify, and if necessary, jam a drone’s communication signals, AUDS shows the 
greatest potential to secure large areas from unwarranted drone activity.41 Until 
US laws regarding jamming technology are changed, however, AUDS will not be 
an option for facilities such as the Port of Opal City.42 
Proposed Solutions and Conclusion
The Port of Opal City is currently pursuing legal options designed to restrict 
drone takeoffs and landings on port property. Because the FAA regulates the 
entirety of the US national airspace system, this may be the best regulatory op-
tion for the Port of Opal City to pursue at this time. A secondary policy option 
would be for the port to take advantage of existing FAA guidance, which man-
dates that drone operators receive permission from all nearby heliport operators 
prior to operating their craft on or near the port facility.43 While there are 
numerous qualifying heliports within the designated two-nautical-mile radius of 
the Port of Opal City, there are currently no sUAS regulations mandating such 
permission, contrary to the guidance provided on the FAA’s website.
At the present time, the largest regulatory hurdle the port must overcome prior 
to using any of the countermeasures described earlier are the legal protections 
given to drones by the FAA. Because all drones are classified as aircraft, they are 
protected from “sabotage” in any form, and knocking a drone out of the sky via 
projectile, net, or bird of prey qualifies as sabotage under existing law.44 Given 
that AUDS uses a combination of proprietary cybernetic countermeasures and is 
designed to be used at airports in the near future, such facilities will need to re-
ceive special legal permission prior to deploying the AUDS’s jamming technology. 
An argument can therefore be made that, due to the economic importance of 
the port, it should receive similar legal protection and the right to strategically 
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that the Port of Opal City pursue legislation at the federal level that would give 
it and all other critical infrastructure facilities the right to use either cybernetic 
countermeasures or the AUDS.
As with any developing technology, drones can be used as either a benefit or 
a detriment to society. Drones empower the private citizen to reach areas that 
were previously inaccessible and to deliver goods in highly unconventional ways. 
The SPE Risk Assessment of the Port of Opal City reveals that critical infra-
structure sites are strikingly vulnerable to both deliberate and accidental drone 
incidents and that such exposure will only increase over time. It is imperative 
that both civilian and military security officials are aware of and have access to 
the tools necessary to safely and legally combat this developing threat. On the 
ever-changing battlefield against modern terrorism, attacks that are prevented 
due to strategic forethought and the implementation of proper security coun-
termeasures are rarely accounted as victories. Taking proactive steps to mitigate 
the quickly emerging threat of drones will help to ensure the security of critical 
infrastructure sites and the vital services that such assets provide to society. v
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On 19 April 1993, a religious sect known as the Branch David-
ians, living near Waco, Texas, became a household name when the world 
watched live on television as 76 followers died at the hands of the FBI.1 The FBI 
described those who died in the inferno as members of a murderous cult who 
were being manipulated by a religious charlatan and who were committed to 
violently resisting any intrusions. As investigations unfolded, however, the FBI’s 
narrative increasingly appeared to be inaccurate. The Branch Davidians were not 
a cult in the vein of Jonestown or Heaven’s Gate, as the FBI had described them, 
but embraced a fundamentalist interpretation of Christian Adventist ideology.2 
In dismissing their religious nature and labeling them as a murderous cult, the 
FBI profoundly misunderstood the Davidians and their motivations. Similarly, 
fundamentalist Muslim ideologies that have taken hold in the Middle East, in 
the form of ISIS and the Taliban, for example, cannot accurately be characterized 
as “murderous death cults” or as inherently un-Islamic, as US and other Western 
policy makers have repeatedly asserted.3 Just as the Branch Davidians espoused 
an exceedingly fundamentalist interpretation of Christian Adventist thought, 
ISIS and its unique brand of Salafism represent an exceedingly fundamentalist 
view of Islamic dogma. If we do not wish to see the tragedy of Waco unfold on 
the global stage, the United States and its allies cannot afford to make the same 
mistakes that the US Justice Department made with the Branch Davidians. ISIS’s 
opponents must fully understand the group’s fundamentalist motivations in 
order to effectively counter them. 
Definitions: Millennialism and Absolutism and 
Inerrancy
The paramount defining trait of fundamentalist religious thought is the 
notion of returning to a “golden age” or a “sacred past,” and the assertion that 
mainstream religion has lost its way and must return to the more righteous days 
of old.4 Based on this conviction, fundamentalist leaders like Branch Davidian 
David Koresh and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi of ISIS claim that their teachings are 
not novel or new in any way. To expose the corruption of the status quo and 
reinforce their point of view, fundamentalist leaders will often cite strict inter-
pretations of judiciously selected religious texts. A carefully selected canon feeds 
the fundamentalist narrative, while conveniently ignoring any passages that may 
contradict it.5 For fundamentalists, there is no other way, no acceptable alterna-
tive course than this return to the religion’s beginnings. In such a worldview, 
these beliefs and teachings are inerrant and absolute because they derive directly 
from the source, which is God. To imbue a further sense of urgency, leaders often 
incorporate millennialist designs into the message, as is apparent with both the 
Davidians and ISIS. This article examines the fundamentalist attributes of millen-
nialism, absolutism, and inerrancy, and sharp boundaries (between believers and 




The Branch Davidians trace their roots to William Miller, the founding father 
of Adventist thought. Miller’s followers believed that scriptures revealed the 
Christian messiah’s return (the Advent) and that the ensuing end of time 
would occur on 22 October 1844.6 When this date came and passed without 
incident, disillusioned Adventists dispersed throughout the United States, 
taking their unique brand of Christian millennialism with them. Adventism 
grew rapidly throughout the United States in the early 1900s, and several 
distinct branches formed. 
One of these sects, the Branch Davidians, attracted committed followers in the 
early part of the twentieth century by placing notable emphasis on Adventist 
millennialism in the vein of William Miller’s teachings (“Davidian” refers to 
the founder’s belief that he was the manifestation of King David).7 Throughout 
the sect’s history, belief that the return of the messiah was imminent was foun-
dational, despite several prophetic disappointments. When David Koresh took 
over as the sect’s leader in 1987, he maintained that only he could anticipate 
Christ’s return. Prophecy and apocalyptic readings from the Book of Revelation 
and descriptions of the end times dominated the Davidians’ beliefs—millen-
nialism provided structure and urgency to all of Koresh’s teachings. He and his 
followers believed that the culmination of their struggles on Earth would usher 
in the violent end of history, and it was their duty to be ready. To prepare for 
this impending struggle, the Branch Davidians began amassing a large arsenal of 
firearms and explosives, which naturally drew the attention of law enforcement 
and resulted in a forceful confrontation.8 Violence is the sought-for and inevi-
table end of millennial thought, and the FBI brought that fight to the Branch 
Davidians’ front door. 
Similar to the Branch Davidians, the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), forerunner of 
ISIS, grew as an offshoot of a larger religious movement under the leadership 
of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi.9 Operating against the US-led coalition within Iraq 
under the auspices of al Qaeda, Baghdadi and his followers began to proclaim an 
increasingly apocalyptic narrative, resulting in their expulsion from the terrorist 
group.10 Abu Omar al-Baghdadi was killed in April 2010, and Abu Bakr al-Bagh-
dadi succeeded him as leader of the ISI. Bakr al-Baghdadi’s faction, now known 
as ISIS, commenced its own brand of jihadist violence, declaring the revival of the 
mytho-historical caliphate, seizing territory across Iraq and Syria, and expanding 
its apocalyptic narrative of Islamic renewal and victory over the West. The “end 
of days” is as eminent to ISIS as it was to the Branch Davidians, and ISIS’s role in 
ushering it in is not any less central to the group’s beliefs. In the Syrian town of 
Dabiq, which it captured in 2014, ISIS eagerly awaited the opening salvos of the 
battle that would usher in the apocalypse. Citing Islamic prophecy, ISIS believed 
that Dabiq was where this final battle would take place, despite the fact that it is 
a small town located amid largely uncontested farmland.11 Every bomb that fell 
on Dabiq or on surrounding ISIS territory fed the narrative that the final battle 
was brewing. Just as David Koresh pointed to the FBI’s tanks and helicopters 
amassing outside his compound’s walls as the final fulfillment of his prophecy, 
ISIS points to every violent effort to suppress it as the fulfillment of Qur’anic 
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Absolutism and Inerrancy 
David Koresh displayed an amazing depth of knowledge about New Testament 
scripture and Adventist ideology. He would memorize large portions of scripture 
verbatim and recite them with remarkable charisma. His followers described 
an almost hypnotic quality to his sermons.12 Psychologists Robert Robins and 
Jerrold Post observed, “Using a unique interpretation of scripture to justify his 
leadership actions, Koresh systematically developed a closed and controlled 
social system that required total devotion to his divine personage and enshrined 
himself as ‘the chosen one.’”13 
In some of his most controversial teachings, Koresh presented a corrupted 
interpretation of scripture to justify the taking of many wives, some of whom 
were children.14 To question Koresh’s actions, including his sexual misconduct, 
would be to question the very foundation of Branch Davidian ideology. His 
teachings were inerrant and absolute, and as such could justify anything that 
served his church. When critics challenged Koresh, the Davidians dismissed 
their ideas as a symptom of the secular world, a contagion requiring removal. As 
Koresh’s teachings increasingly came into conflict with social convention and 
secular laws, the Davidians withdrew from society, isolating themselves further 
within the compound near Waco. 
While ISIS is operating on a much larger scale than the Davidians, its funda-
mentalism is not unique in regard to absolutist and inerrant teachings. ISIS has 
shown the world a degree of cruelty not seen since the Middle Ages: weaponized 
rape, child brides, mass beheadings, punitive amputations, legalized slavery, and 
systematic genocide are some of ISIS’s more atrocious practices. At first glance, 
it seems impossible for a rational person to reconcile these actions with any 
conventional notions of Islamic or Western jurisprudence. Given ISIS’s extreme 
nature, it is easy to point to these atrocities and declare ISIS to be un-Islamic, 
a fraud, a religious façade meant to conceal self-serving attempts to expand 
power at enormous human cost. While certainly ISIS has attracted its share of 
self-serving adventurers, its leaders have carefully selected Qur’anic scriptures 
to justify their actions.15 ISIS members not only claim that slavery and rape are 
acceptable, for example, they go so far as to claim that rape is pleasing to God. 
According to a report in the New York Times, ISIS rapists pray before raping, 
rape, and then pray after raping. They are not praying for forgiveness; rather, the 
rape is part of the religious ritual that is supposed to please God.16 Something 
as universally condemned as rape is consistent with Salafi interpretations within 
the realm of ISIS’s absolutist inerrancy. To label ISIS as an un-Islamic movement 
motivated only by egregious rapacity is to completely misunderstand both its 
motivation and capacity for malevolence.
Sharp Boundaries
The extraordinary characteristics of millennialism, absolutism, and inerrancy 
inevitably lead to both an ideological and a geographic separation of fundamen-
talist movements from their mainstream religious roots. The desire to produce 
the apocalypse, proclaim extremist ideologies, and decree absolutist theological 
law is simply incompatible with the conventional world. Fundamentalist move-
ments tend to develop well-defined boundaries between the saved and sinful as 
one of their critical characteristics. David Koresh found geographic isolation a 
necessity to cultivate his teachings without outside scrutiny, which led the sect 








to relocate to a secure compound near Waco. As the group’s theology became 
increasingly extremist, the enforcement of these physical and psychological 
boundaries became increasingly militant in nature. To allow the FBI to walk 
through the front door and violate these boundaries was not acceptable, and the 
Davidians met the officers with extraordinary violence.
ISIS, on the other hand, does not confine itself to a compound; its territory is 
vast and until recently was expanding. The boundaries it wishes to erect, how-
ever, are not any less absolute or important, just on a much larger scale. On 29 
June 2014, Baghdadi declared the Caliphate, a strategic maneuver that not only 
gave ISIS de jure legitimacy to wage jihad according to Baghdadi’s interpretation 
of the Qur’an, but also promulgated physical boundaries between itself and the 
rest of the world.17 ISIS laid claim to its own territory to rally true believers the 
world over and insulate its fundamentalist ideologies from any moderate Muslim 
influences. 
Recommendations
In the case of the Branch Davidians, the US government descended on the 
Waco compound with force and began a highly publicized 52-day siege. Koresh 
explained to his flock that the federal assault was merely the opening volley in 
Armageddon, the fulfillment of his prophecies, the “opening of the fifth seal,” 
as he called it. The FBI’s aggressive response galvanized Koresh’s followers by 
playing directly into his apocalyptic narrative. Fundamentally misunderstanding 
the Branch Davidians’ motivations, the FBI treated Koresh as a hostage taker: 
they negotiated for the release of his “hostages” while refusing to engage or 
acknowledge Koresh’s fundamentalist ideologies in any way.18 
His followers, however, were true believers, not hostages, and did not want 
“rescue.” Highly respected Adventist scholars offered to speak with Koresh and 
offered him an alternative interpretation to the Book of Revelation. Koresh re-
sponded positively, but the FBI refused to support the effort.19 Koresh explained 
to the leaders that he needed more time to finish writing his interpretations of 
scripture, but again this was something that the FBI would not oblige. Historian 
Malcolm Gladwell argues that, had the federal forces tactically paused and 
allowed Koresh to engage other Adventists and further contemplate his situa-
tion, his apocalyptic narrative would have unraveled.20 Koresh believed that the 
armies of Armageddon in the coming apocalypse would not pause for debate or 
contemplation—they would attack without warning, and the FBI fulfilled his vi-
sion. In launching their attack, the FBI could not have more perfectly galvanized 
the Branch Davidians’ fundamentalist beliefs in a fight to the death. To this day, 
“Waco” is the rallying cry for domestic terror groups in the United States, an 
illustration of federal overreach, and a case study in law enforcement ineptitude.
The Islamic State has been enjoying a similar kind of ideological galvanization 
through US policy in the Middle East. The United States and its allies have pro-
claimed that ISIS is not Islamic, and the coalition’s military forces have applied 
hard power solutions with little effect and varying intensity. Some politicians 
have called for carpet-bombing, torture, and even nuclear war to combat the 
fundamentalist group. Like the FBI’s attack on the extremist Christians, nothing 
could more perfectly feed ISIS’s fundamentalist Islamic narrative. 
KORESH EXPLAINED TO 
HIS FLOCK THAT THE 
FEDERAL ASSAULT WAS 
THE OPENING VOLLEY 
IN ARMAGEDDON. 
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As the FBI learned at Waco, however, there are alternative courses of action 
to consider. If the United States focused on containing ISIS, while moderate 
Muslim leadership (particularly Salafi leaders in Saudi Arabia) engaged 
them ideologically, their apocalyptic narrative would soon unravel. Without an 
enemy storming into Dabiq and bringing the end times, the extremist notions 
ISIS harnesses to brutalize its constituents will appear desperate and unwar-
ranted. It may be the long game, but burning down the Middle East with ISIS 
inside it will only further engender anti-Western extremist ideologies the world 
over, presenting new threats and inciting further fundamentalist extremism. v
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Like the emerging threat of hybrid warfare, which blurs the 
lines between state-sponsored aggression and insurgency, the delineation 
between criminal organizations and terrorist organizations can be hard to distin-
guish. Networked organized crime organizations, such as criminal motorcycle 
gangs (CMGs), are more similar to terrorist organizations than they are different. 
The incentives for their activities are the main difference between CMGs and 
terrorists; for instance, biker gangs primarily want money and prestige, while ter-
rorists want political change. Because of these similarities, an analytical model of 
the kind used by security analysts to assess the relative strengths and weaknesses 
of terrorist groups can help explain how criminal organizations, law enforcement 
agencies, and other critical players interact. 
Law enforcement agencies and military organizations also share many similari-
ties. Both organizations can learn from each other: one Swedish criminal intel-
ligence department, for example, used a combined approach with some success 
in one of Sweden’s police counties.1 In the end, the military and police both have 
the authority and responsibility to use violence as a last resort to protect their 
societies in this ambiguous hide-and-seek threat environment. The legality of 
using the military in a domestic situation varies from country to country, but 
with some minor adjustments and in collaboration with the rest of the com-
munity, law enforcement and military organizations can be strengthened to deal 
with present and future threats. This article explores Sweden’s evolving efforts 
to combat CMGs with the help of military analytical tools and looks at whether 
Sweden’s experience can serve as a model not only for other countries that are 
fighting organized crime but also for countering terrorist networks. 
A New Threat Reaches Sweden
Twenty-five years ago, no one anticipated the startling level of organized 
criminal activity that would exist in Sweden today. As a result of the growth in 
organized crime, the police and civil authorities have to be continually reactive, 
focusing on crimes that have already been committed and on investigating and 
arresting individuals rather than taking the time to look into each criminal or-
ganization as a whole. The situation began in the early 1990s, when the so-called 
“1%” motorcycle gangs first took root in Sweden. (The gangs took the label “1%” 
to declare their outlaw status, as opposed to the “99%” of motorcycle riders who 
are law-abiding.) Today the CMGs lead by example and demonstrate the pos-
sibilities of networked organized crime for newer gangs. 
Because Sweden had no criminal and police intelligence structures at the local 
or regional levels in the early 1990s (apart from the civilian security service), 
law enforcement authorities and policy makers had no tools for understanding 
this new type of crime network through situational awareness and intelligence 
development. Law enforcement is focused mainly on petty crimes, burglary, 
theft, narcotics, and robbery. An established criminal intelligence structure could 
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have anticipated the rise in criminal gang activity and helped Sweden address the 
problems before they grew out of hand. Sweden was not prepared to face this 
new threat when it first appeared, so authorities are still “playing catch up” and 
focusing on repressive strategies while public safety continues to decline.2 
Characteristics of the Criminal Motorcycle Gang Hells Angels
Organized crime can be said to live off society by offering the public high-
demand goods and services that the government wants to ban or regulate. These 
include alcohol, cigarettes, drugs, prostitution, pirated media, cheap or black 
market labor, real estate, and transport.3 Like other businesses, organized crime 
groups such as the CMGs do not prosper in a society in chaos. The gangs are not 
trying to break down society but work, instead, to undermine or disrupt its legal 
framework and shift economic activities in a direction that favors their interests 
and promotes their primary sources of income.4 The Hells Angels organization 
operates as a successful transnational and stateless network. It is composed of 
members who have made a pledge of loyalty to a certain “brand” and franchise 
and who share a set of beliefs and unity of purpose. The organization depends 
on status, loyalty, identity, and an alternate way of life; and it preserves its own 
internal social safety net. This self-contained structure can severely undermine a 
“host” nation’s legitimacy and authority, as well as the rule of law.5 
In a 2014 study, crime analyst Alexandra Jones compared Europe’s CMGs with 
jihadist groups. She noted, “As it is the nature of street gangs and jihadists to 
strive for control over territory, they look to control not just hearts and minds 
but actual neighborhoods on which they will impose their own rules and where 
they can stave off fiscal and judicial intervention.”6 Hells Angels is known for 
its use of fear and intimidation to achieve its goals.7 New members undergo 
rigorous screening and indoctrination, and they have to work their way up in 
the organization by earning respect.8 Like many jihadist organizations, once 
someone is accepted into Hells Angels, he can almost never leave. The organiza-
tion’s management philosophy is to centralize decision making and decentralize 
action. Hells Angels has several chapters, or “charters,” each of which has a small 
core leadership that controls an organizational structure along the lines of a 
business enterprise. On average, a charter needs to have at least six members, 
including a president, vice president, secretary, treasurer, sergeant-at-arms 
(responsible for security), and road captain. The illicit income-making activities 
are conducted mainly by constellation cells, consisting of one or more members 
who work with people outside the group.9 There are often some supporters and 
followers connected to each cell who provide services such as logistical support, 
recruitment, various kinds of subject matter expertise, financial support, intel-
ligence, manpower, and safe havens. 
Because of the tight control that the Hells Angels leadership exerts over its 
members, it is harder for law enforcement officers to penetrate and gather 
incriminating evidence from the Hells Angels organization than it is to gather 
intelligence about them.10 The gang’s reputation for being fearless and violent 
is strengthened by a “noble outlaw” myth similar to Robin Hood and other 
underdog storylines. This myth is often enhanced by the media and the promo-
tional efforts and marketing of the organization itself. Local affiliated CMG groups 
usually act in the name of the Hells Angels brand to bolster their own reputations. 
From this description, it becomes apparent that many features of the motorcycle 




How did Hells Angels gain such a strong foothold in Sweden? Sweden is 
roughly the size of the state of California in area (450,296 square kilometers) 
and currently has a population of nearly 10 million people. When Hells Angels 
first took root in Sweden at the beginning of the 1990s, its members fought a 
violent turf war (known as the Nordic Biker War, 1992–1997) with the Ban-
didos motorcycle gang.11 Hells Angels prevailed due to its tight organizational 
structure and its extensive network of contacts with similar gangs throughout 
Sweden and the world.12 Eventually, however, the clubs struck an uneasy truce 
and divided the Swedish “market” by both geography and criminal domains. 
Hells Angels remains the top-tier organized crime operation in Sweden.13 There 
are now 14 Hells Angels charters and eight supporting charters, called the Red 
Devils, located along main highways and roads across Sweden. A step below the 
Red Devils are a number of support gangs named the Red & White Crew. Due 
to this hierarchical structure of proxies and supporters, the core members of a 
Hells Angels chapter do not need to be directly involved in criminal activities, 
and the chapters themselves have deniability. These lower-tier affiliates also offer 
alternative ways for new recruits to join a Hells Angels charter in the hopes of 
eventually becoming “full-patch” members.14
Today, shell companies controlled by the club launder money, and the organiza-
tion has managed to intermingle the black market with the white market (for 
instance, through transportation and construction companies), which means 
that the normal citizen is often indirectly and unwittingly supporting criminal 
activity.15 The Swedish government loses about US$8 billion each year in tax 
income because of the black market in Sweden, and Hells Angels controls a 
significant portion of that market.16 
The Hells Angels have also created a system of executive control over other 
gangs. That is, if an ordinary motorcycle club wants to have its own patch and 
wear a vest, this first needs to be approved and sanctioned by the Hells Angels 
organization. Indirectly, Hells Angels controls the biker culture and some of the 
more than 300 ordinary motorcycle clubs in Sweden that don’t necessarily have 
anything to do with either criminality or the Hells Angels organization. These 
biker clubs, however, are a perfect recruitment source (although far from the 
only source) for Hells Angels and its affiliates. This system of oversight allows 
recruits, prospects, and hangers-on to be vetted several times before they become 
full-patch members.17 Today, there are nearly 170 full-patch members and 250 
supporters of Hells Angels in Sweden.18
Further Diagnostics: The Current Situation
In a 2014 lecture, Professor Gordon McCormick of the US Naval Postgraduate 
School stated that “Sweden has become tolerable to the intolerable.”19 To a cer-
tain extent, this is true. The Hells Angels organization has acted as a vanguard of 
organized crime in Sweden by taking advantage of the weakness of Sweden’s legal 
system and the absence of anti-gang laws. Liberal democracies like Sweden can 
have difficulty turning to violent and repressive means to combat criminality and 
other societal disruptions, including civil unrest.20 The CMGs’ activities have cre-
ated a void in society because policy makers and law enforcement agencies have 
lost the initiative in controlling them. Sweden lacks a comprehensive “whole of 
society” strategy or approach to organized crime. In short, although gangs are 
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committing crimes that affect normal citizens, a judicial 
process and adequate laws for combating these gangs are 
still missing. This void is currently being exploited by new 
criminal gangs that have lowered the threshold for using 
violence and intimidation in their activities. Conse-
quently, there have been increased incidences of shootings 
and other violent crimes in the cities of Gothenburg, 
Malmö, and Stockholm.21 The situation, as it is being 
reported in the media, has caused concern in Europe and 
elsewhere. Some German authorities have commented 
on the need to combat these criminal organizations and 
create strong laws to avoid becoming “like Sweden.”22
Organized crime gangs pose a clear and present threat 
to Swedish society—a threat that has largely been over-
looked due to compartmentalization within the country’s 
police and government agencies, inadequate criminal 
policies, lack of an intelligence structure, and fiscal 
austerity.23 Just over 20,000 police officers are divided 
among 25 counties in Sweden.24 Because of shift work, at 
the most, 8,000 uniformed police officers can be on the 
streets of the entire country at any given time. Sweden, 
with a population of 9.6 million, has, on average, 206 
police officers per 100,000 residents.25 By comparison, 
Germany fields 300, and the EU averages 350 officers per 
100,000 people.26  
Sweden’s low ratio of police to citizens might be accept-
able if a high percentage of the citizens were law abiding, 
but this may not be the case. Värmland County, for 
instance, constitutes 4.3 percent of Sweden’s territory, 
nearly the same size as New Jersey or Massachusetts. 
In 2006, roughly 420 police officers were assigned to 
Värmland County, which meant that, on average, five or 
six patrol cars, with two police officers in each car, were on 
patrol at night.27 At the same time, the county’s Criminal 
Intelligence Department had just one analyst working 
less than full-time on all CMGs in Värmland County. By 
comparison, Hells Angels, its affiliates, and hangers-on 
had about 20 people directly involved in criminal activity 
in the county, apart from the activities of other gangs 
active in Värmland. Hells Angels and other criminal gangs 
operating in Sweden had a distinct advantage over law en-
forcement, not only in terms of numbers of members but 
also in their ability to choose the time and place for their 
activities. The gangs can choose whether to concentrate 
their efforts in a given sector, such as bringing drugs into 
one area, or whether to spread out the activity to avoid 
detection, depending on the presence of law enforcement 
and the gang’s needs. 
Hells Angels, along with other crime organizations, is 
considered by Sweden’s law enforcement agencies to be a 
“system-threatening organization.”28 The Swedish judicial 
system is especially at risk. In 2003 and 2004, Swedish au-
thorities took actions to combat serious crimes related to 
the motorcycle gangs and others. In response, the targeted 
gangs used tactics of intimidation, including the use of 
violence; blackmail; and the stalking of not only judges, 
police officers, lawyers, jurors, prosecutors, and witnesses 
but also family members and other relatives of the gangs’ 
targets.29 In effect, the entire Swedish judicial system has 
been under threat from members or affiliates of these 
criminal organizations. Prosecutors and judges have been 
reluctant to present or decide cases. It has also become 
more difficult to gather useful evidence from witnesses, 
investigate crimes, and prosecute criminals. Intelligence 
by itself is rarely admissible in court, although intelligence 
can sometimes be turned into evidence if needed.
This means that a slower decision-making loop obstructs 
the judicial processes, which leads to confusion and 
insecurity. In this climate, there is potential for bribery 
and corruption, which historically have been hard to 
prove. These crimes against societal institutions, such as 
the judiciary, can drive a wedge through society and create 
even more space in which criminals can maneuver. In 
other words, the pressure gangs put on the judicial system 
can serve as a foundation for widespread corruption 
among public officials.30
Sweden’s public and private organizations and entities, 
such as the police force, schools, local communities, social 
services, and commerce, are compartmentalized. That is, 
they work in a stove-piped manner and normally do not 
exchange strategy and information. Local institutions 
and political parties often support different law enforce-
ment policies and goals, but the nation’s police force is 
commanded and controlled at the national level. These 
factors are hurdles to the development of a comprehensive 
strategy to combat crime. 
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Because Sweden’s citizens enjoy the right to freedom of association, neither the 
state nor other authorities (such as employers) may either compel or prevent a 
citizen’s association with a legitimate individual or entity of his or her choosing. 
The main policy argument against use of the judicial process to curtail gang 
activity is that, although members of a motorcycle gang may commit crimes, 
this does not make the whole club or association criminal. Thus freedom of 
association has precedence over law enforcement, which makes it hard to create 
laws that target these groups, or to argue against the establishment of new CMGs 
in Sweden. These legal obstacles also limit cooperation between law enforce-
ment agencies and civilian authorities, and undermine the police’s ability to 
operationalize any anti-gang strategy. In general, the civilian police do not want 
to comment on or discuss the criminal motorcycle clubs, which makes it difficult 
for the country to engage in an open debate about this criminal activity, collect 
intelligence, or conduct what the military calls information operations.31 
Swedish law enforcement authorities did not have a criminal intelligence organi-
zation in the late 1990s when the biker gangs were spreading. Investigations were 
performed in an ad hoc manner. The first criminal intelligence units stood up 
nearly eight years after the start of the Nordic Biker Wars in 1992, but a domestic 
national intelligence model was not introduced until 2006. Sweden’s military, 
like most others, has always had some intelligence apparatus and processes to de-
velop estimates, so the police were able to adopt some processes and techniques 
from military intelligence doctrine. 
A Comparison of Sweden’s Law Enforcement 
Organization and Its Military
In most democratic countries, the police forces and the military are symbols 
of government control and the guardians of civil society. While the two sec-
tors support each other to some extent, there are some important differences 
between them, as shown in figure 1. Most significantly, law enforcement focuses 
on internal, domestic threats while the military focuses on external threats to 
the nation-state. A police officer can work his or her entire career in the same 
district, which imparts a profound situational understanding that military 
personnel rarely enjoy. In recent times, many countries’ armed forces have 
been used in out-of-area roles (e.g., in Afghanistan) and thus have developed 
an expeditionary mindset. Moreover, the military is known for planning and 
for having contingencies, while law enforcement’s core activity is responsive 
in nature. If there is no crime, then law enforcement does not need to respond 
beyond the routine activities of protecting and serving. The military necessarily 
has a large support and command and control structure, while law enforcement 
uses a rather static infrastructure. 
One major structural difference is that law enforcement officers perform their 
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much larger formations and units. Police units are more 
geographically focused and concentrate on their jurisdic-
tion over a much longer period of time than military 
units. The military uses targeting practices that aim to 
defeat, destroy, or neutralize the enemy or a subsystem 
of targets. These targets can be individuals or organiza-
tions, or they may be material, structures, and equipment. 
Conversely, law enforcement focuses almost entirely on 
the individual perpetrator or a relatively small group (see 
figure 1). As they go about their ordinary lives, citizens 
may occasionally see or interact with the military, but law 
enforcement is an intentionally visible part of civil society.
The role of the judiciary and rules of evidence are quite 
different for law enforcement and military personnel. 
Police investigations must be careful, thorough, and 
detailed enough that their results can be presented in a 
court of law. Law enforcement officers may be required 
to testify publicly in a courtroom. In contrast, this level 
of constraint on detail and procedure does not normally 
apply to military personnel. 
Analysis: Integrating It All
This section uses some common military analytical 
models, including Center of Gravity (CoG) analysis and 
Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunity, and Threat (SWOT) 
analysis, to produce a comprehensive theoretical descrip-
tion of the criminal biker organizations that are the sub-
ject of this article. Military assessment models like CoG 
analysis and SWOT analysis had not been invented at the 
time the gangs first became a serious threat, but they may 
be useful for controlling them in the future. It is vital for 
states and their security apparatus to be very clear about 
what law enforcement organizations and the judiciary can 
and cannot do within the law and still win the conviction 
of a criminal. When it comes to international criminal 
networks like the CMGs, the government’s alternatives and 
possibilities are even harder to define because different 
countries have different problems, laws, and approaches 
to security. Meanwhile, outlaw biker gangs continue to 
take advantage of this legal vacuum and disregard national 
borders.32 
LAW ENFORCEMENT (LE) MILITARY OPERATIONS COMMENTS
Works locally, at municipal and 
county levels
Expeditionary, operates out of home region Expeditionary warfare has been the norm of 
Western forces over the last few decades. 
Normally, the military is focused on external 
threats and LE domestic threats.
Generally supports domestic culture 
and norms
Operates in and supports foreign cultures LE know the terrain they work in. More 
often than not, the terrain is unfamiliar in 
military operations.
Reactive, first responders to crises Pre-planned strategies and operations
Close to, works with emergency 
services
Operates in remote areas, relies on in-
house medics on various levels
Established communication structure Expeditionary and adaptive
Evidence and investigation-led, 
supports judicial processes
Intelligence-led/intelligence driven
Rule of law Laws of armed conflict, OP-plans and OP-
orders with rules of engagements
Small patrols (individuals/pairs/
teams)
Larger formation-sized units SOF usually operate in small numbers. 
Conventional forces tend to operate in 
platoon- or company-sized and even bigger 
formations. Support and sustainment 
requirements are enormous compared with 
LE.
Typically focused on individual 
criminals
Typically targets organizations and systems Military organizations sometimes target 
individuals, and can also target other parts of 
a system, including communications, roads, 
power, infrastructure.
Criminal usually has an interest in 
money and/or power 
Opponent has political and financial 
interests; military has security interest
Role is to investigate, protect, arrest, 
and convict
Role is to destroy, defeat, degrade, and 
neutralize
Security and peacekeeping are important 
to LE. Fire power and armed response are 
important in military operations.
Figure 1. Differences between Law Enforcement and Military Organizations
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One of the chief contributions a military-style threat assessment can make to 
law enforcement is that the assessment considers both “Red” side (enemy) and 
“Blue” side (friendly) actions and capabilities, rather than focusing solely on the 
opponent. This Red-versus-Blue comparison is necessary for law enforcement 
personnel to confront organized criminal activity. The need for legitimacy in 
gathering evidence for prosecution and for various anti-gang laws, is also an im-
portant consideration when states are trying to deal with violent non-state actors.
This analysis focuses more on areas of “relative power” such as mind-set, abilities, 
and views than would a typical military force-on-force comparison. The main 
goal is to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the government’s legal and se-
curity structures and civil society groups and institutions. Once these values have 
been identified, they are compared against the strengths and weaknesses of the 
criminal gangs; the findings will give the Swedish government the information 
it needs to operationalize the most suitable and viable actions to combat these 
criminal organizations. Normally, law enforcement agencies and the military in 
Sweden do not work together against a domestic threat. The military’s analytical 
methods and experiences from policing operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, 
and elsewhere, however, could readily support the Swedish police agencies 
through a military assistance program.33
The problem for Sweden’s law enforcement community is not the typical law 
enforcement problem of simply finding the criminals; the police understand 
what the criminal networks are doing today and how they work.34 Law enforce-
ment generally takes three approaches to ensure community safety: education, 
prevention, and enforcement. All three approaches should be used in combating 
both criminal networks like the CMGs and terrorist networks. The criminal 
and police intelligence on gang activity is credible, and the motorcycle clubs, 
charters, members, and associates have already been well mapped-out through a 
social network approach. Several criminologists in Sweden have also sufficiently 
analyzed and explained the main underlying causes of the gangs’ spread. 
Reliable information about the gangs’ future intentions, however, is the most 
difficult intelligence to collect and confirm. The biggest obstacle to prosecu-
tion, given Sweden’s legal environment, 
is finding the evidence—as compared to 
intelligence—that will win convictions in 
court. In law enforcement, intelligence is 
normally used to point to evidence, but 
because intelligence often lacks detail or 
sufficient proof, it often may not be used 
as evidence in a court of law. Moreover, 
the police continue to focus on the indi-
viduals and not the organization.35 The 
underlying reasons why individuals join 
gangs and why gangs spread are complex 
and usually outside the responsibility of 
law enforcement. To develop a compre-
hensive “whole of society” approach to 
combating criminal or terrorist networks, 
analysts need to put more effort into 




















Figure 2. The Blue (Government), Red (CMG),  
and Green (Civil Society) Actors in Sweden
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Blue side but also the “Green” side—social services, schools, local communities, 
and other societal/environmental factors. Figure 2 illustrates some of these 
relationships. The proximity of the ovals in the illustration reflects the relative, 
approximate, and estimated closeness of the various actors to one another.
An analysis of three key factors for each sector—in this example, foundation, 
characteristics, and organizational structure—reveals that there are some critical 
capabilities and requirements that are vital for the government to protect, such 
as free and independent elections and access to high-quality education (see 
figure 3). Normally, a military assessment is limited to the opponent and one’s 
own organization, for comparison. A law enforcement assessment, however, 
also needs to include the civil society and the impact it can have on developing a 
working comprehensive strategy.
Once an analysis has outlined the key factors for a sector/organization, the CoG 
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DESIRED END STATE A prosperous and independent country Independent and alternative lifestyle free from 
civil authority
CENTER OF GRAVITY Democracy by election, supported by rule of law “Brotherhood” and loyalty
CRITICAL 
CAPABILITIES
Law enforcement, independent judiciary, law-abiding 
citizens, rule-based honest governance, taxation, free 
elections, social security network, open independent 
media, mass access to education
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Figure 4. Center of Gravity Analysis: Blue and Red
Spring 2017
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needs in order to function and the critical requirements necessary to support 
those capabilities.36 Using this sort of analysis to understand a CMG’s capabilities 
and requirements has been outside the police’s typical focus on individual gang 
members (see figure 4).37 What is more, with the support of the CoG model, a 
law enforcement agency can learn critical information about the strengths and 
weaknesses of its own organization and the society it works within. 
To thrive, Hells Angels needs the freedom of action to enforce its internal laws 
and continue to expand both its membership and the scope of its “business” 
enterprises. The club’s primary method for maintaining discipline and increasing 
membership is the “stick and carrot,” that is, a fluid combination of fear, loyalty, 
and money. Outlaw biker gangs also need to build and maintain a network for 
recruitment and to promote their criminal activity (see figure 4).
For an organization to develop a counter strategy, it needs to have a clear picture 
of the opponent’s vulnerabilities and strengths. One way to do this is by using 
a SWOT analysis once the CoG model has identified critical requirements and 
capabilities. In this example of the CMGs, the findings show that there are some 
opportunities for law enforcement to push back against the gangs, but there 
are also threats that need to be addressed. For example, figure 5 shows that the 
intimidation of officials by violent criminals can become a threat for both Blue 
and Green and must be taken into account for the future. The Blue side needs 
to protect itself from corruption and erosion of the rule of law. The Blue side 
must also overcome what can be characterized as a lack of political will and 
create strong criminal laws. The data in the row titled “Opportunity” show that 
the Blue side has yet to take advantage of opportunities to educate the public 
and make optimal use of available information and media platforms—credible 
information about the criminal gangs has to come through the authorities and 
not just through news stories. The media’s information channels, as well as the 
government’s, can be used to discredit CMGs, create a narrative of official fairness 
and civic lawfulness, and explicitly state what is at stake for the whole of society. 
This example shows that use of the media and cooperation between Green and 
Blue should be exploited as an opportunity to combat CMGs. The lack of political 
will to change laws in Sweden, along with gray areas of responsibility and insti-
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and the police rarely use media or other means of com-
munication to influence or educate civil society. Political 
hesitancy, overstretched police forces, and slow decision 
making within law enforcement’s leadership are creating 
a security gap and interfering with the judicial process. 
Individuals feel insecure when the official strategies that 
are in place seem faulty or when they don’t understand 
why a disruptive event has taken place. If Red is exploiting 
weaknesses and undermining rule of law, then Sweden’s 
politicians must do what is necessary to create stronger 
laws and provide law enforcement with adequate resources 
to uphold the law.
Blue and Green together must continue to put pressure on 
the personnel of the Red’s core hierarchy. 
The treasurer and sergeant-at-arms, for 
example, could be the focus of leader-
ship targeting rather than the president 
of the club. Normally, the presidents are 
investigated because they are the “shot 
callers”—the authorities in charge. The 
other two roles, however, can be seen 
as the glue that holds the charter or the 
club together. Many insights and op-
portunities for further exploitation can 
be gained by pressuring and eventually 
arresting the people in these positions. 
Conclusion: Key Takeaways and 
Suggestions for a Way Forward
Both law enforcement agencies and the military can learn 
from each other. Using modeling and sharing lessons 
learned can improve each organization’s ability to combat 
criminal gangs and terrorist organizations respectively. 
The CoG model can help policy makers clarify a desired 
end state for their country’s civil society and law enforce-
ment and then define the policies they must adopt to 
reduce the impact of CMGs on society. Aspects of the CoG 
and SWOT models, along with other military analytical 
tools, were used with some success in 2006 by a criminal 
intelligence department in Sweden to identify individuals 
and subjects for further targeting and investigations. 
This allowed the police to efficiently redirect needed 
resources and eventually win a conviction in court.38 At 
the time, however, Sweden’s law enforcement community 
and its military did not have a common understanding 
or appreciation for one another. The application of the 
models in that case was possible because of the personal 
training and education of this author, not from institu-
tional knowledge. Several years later, however, the author’s 
experiences from working with law enforcement from 
2005 to 2006 were improved on and put into effect by the 
Swedish military.
Sweden now has a national counterterrorism board 
on which several organizations, including the military 
intelligence service, hold a seat. However, this working 
relationship needs further improvement: organizations 
need to shift their mind-set and recognize that there are 
analytical models and experiences that can be shared 
among the intelligence and security services to broaden 
their institutional knowledge. This will be particularly 
important in the future if potential and real adversaries 
erase the borders between terrorism, criminality, and 
low-level political/military aggression.
In Western democracies, there are 
differences and similarities in the 
methods governments use to combat 
terrorist organizations, insurgencies, 
and criminal organizations. For all of 
these countries, however, their security 
services, intelligence services, military 
organizations, law enforcement agencies, 
and civilian organizations can all benefit 
from sharing lessons learned and other 
information. In multinational military 
interventions, such as the operations in 
the Balkans and Afghanistan, the intro-
duction of fusion cells and centers is one useful example 
of operationalizing unity of effort. Several countries have 
also established similar centers for domestic security, 
and it would be wise to continue improving national and 
international cooperation through policies such as the 
exchange of law enforcement and military personnel and 
other governmental officials, multinational training and 
exercises, and professional education beyond a specific 
field of expertise. That is, law enforcement personnel 
should have access to education and training from the 
military and vice versa. Furthermore, from deployments 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, Western militaries, especially 
special operations forces, have developed vast knowledge 
and experience in law enforcement techniques, such as the 
importance of site exploitation and biometrics. 
For international interventions, the military is also begin-
ning to understand the importance of social network 
analysis, which can be used with the CARVER (criticality, 
accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and 
recognizability) targeting system to improve operational 
outcomes.39 These methods should be further developed. 
Military planners should develop streamlined approaches 
for crisis response that will enable forces to react whenever 
needed. For example, a military unit should be able to go 
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after a criminal or terrorist target without the usual cumbersome planning and 
approval processes. This requires military leaders and personnel to develop the 
mind-set to face unknown situations, similar to the way a police patrol responds 
to a call of domestic disturbance without knowing the details of the situation or 
having planned its response ahead of time. 
Sweden has taken great strides to combat terrorists. New legislation and direc-
tives allow the police to bring in military forces, including SOF, under the 
control of the law enforcement chain of command, whenever needed, to combat 
domestic terrorism.40 With regard to organized crime and the CMGs, however, 
this is not the case. The inability of the Swedish judiciary and legislature to op-
erationalize strategies and create bills and laws that adequately address organized 
crime is obvious not only with regard to the biker gangs; it has also contributed 
to ineffective efforts to combat Islamic radicalization in Sweden.41 A perception 
that the judicial process is not working leads people to ask whether the authori-
ties have the ability to uphold law and order and ultimately challenges the state’s 
capacity to exercise complete sovereignty. 
This narrative of weakness can be countered, however, through improved job 
security, information and education campaigns that target the whole of society, 
and the use of police forces to combat criminals. A law that effectively criminal-
izes CMGs and outlaws gang membership is vital to this process. Canada and the 
United States both already have legislation (BILL C-51 [2015] and the RICO Act 
[1970], respectively) that can serve as models for developing Swedish laws against 
criminal gangs. If Sweden fails to act, the void can and will be further exploited by 
international criminal and terrorist organizations, which will not hesitate to use 
the differences between countries’ legal systems to create safe havens and promote 
their activities. Sweden must have leadership at the national level and develop a 
national counter-gang strategy, preferably with broad international cooperation. 
If the sum of efforts is to be greater than its parts, the Swedish government must 
ensure unity of effort by clarifying the authority, mandates, and responsibilities 
of each agency or actor through carefully-crafted, comprehensive legislation 
and policy. Every agency and organization has something to offer and should 
be allowed to do so as part of a comprehensive government-wide response to a 
changing national and multinational security environment. v
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Vera Mironova, Belfer Center for Science  
and International Affairs
Interviewed by Dr. Doug Borer,  
US Naval Postgraduate School
This interview is taken from the collection of the Combating 
Terrorism Archive Project (CTAP).1 On 22 May 2016, Dr. Doug Borer, US Naval 
Postgraduate School, talked with Vera Mironova, a PhD candidate in political 
science at the University of Maryland and a fellow with the Belfer Center for 
Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government, Har-
vard University. They discussed Mironova’s research into how terrorists organize 
themselves and manage their divisions of labor.2 She has spent many months 
on the ground in a number of countries that are dealing with insurgencies and 
currently is observing the battle to retake the city of Mosul, Iraq, from ISIS.3 CTX 
editor Elizabeth Skinner sat in on their discussion.
DOUG BORER: Please begin by giving us an overview of your present work.
VERA MIRONOVA: I am earning my doctoral degree in political science, and I 
also study economics. So I am trying to merge those two disciplines together 
by looking at the internal organizations of terrorist groups—not what they are 
doing in the field, but how they operate inside. Imagine, for example, what a 
nightmare human resources [HR] is for these organizations. They have even a 
harder job than other kinds of organizations because they don’t have a budget 
every year, but also have to look for their funding. And then, being a terrorist 
organization, they have everyone trying to kill them, which makes their job 
even harder. I am studying this because although it’s hard, ISIS has been fairly 
successful at it. A lot of brigades are successful, but actually far more are not. So I 
am trying to see where other brigades made mistakes that caused them to be less 
successful. 
BORER: Are you doing a comparative study or looking at a specific country?
MIRONOVA: I am trying to do both. I am looking at different organizations, 
mostly at the labor market for rebel fighters in civil wars. My three main case 
studies are Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen, and I also have done a little work in Congo. 
I conducted the same survey with fighters in all of those front lines. By studying 
the Ukrainian paramilitary groups in Europe, the Houthis in Yemen, and Sunni 
groups in Syria, it will be easier to generalize from my work, because if something 
works in all of those really diverse places, I could assume it works everywhere. 
BORER: Could you tell us a little bit about your method? Do you actually talk 
with the HR people of non-state armed groups?
MIRONOVA: Yes, I do talk to exactly those people. I interviewed them on the 
front lines. Otherwise, how would we know about their decision making? The 
second question we need to think about is whether or not we believe them. But 
first, let’s talk to them. Those questions that I am asking about the labor market 
are not considered to be intelligence gathering, so it’s not hard to ask them. I 
am not asking where the groups’ finances are coming from or who they want to 
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bomb tomorrow; I’m asking, why did you join? They talk about that with each 
other all the time. They talk on Facebook. They don’t consider this anything 
hard to understand. So that’s why it’s possible to do this research by directly 
talking to them. 
BORER: If you had to summarize maybe the top two or three reasons why people 
join these groups, what would they be? 
MIRONOVA: The first reason some people join terrorist organizations is because 
they are hard-core supporters of the goal. Then some people join for a job—just 
for money. The third group is people who are forced to join.4 So, think about the 
first two reasons. It may be hard to understand these motives when talking about 
terrorist organizations, but I think any organization is like that. There are people 
who, from the day they were born, wanted to go into the military. Good. Other 
people think, Well, I didn’t go to school, so maybe the military is a good idea 
because it pays. So, the same thing with armed groups. Like any organization, 
armed groups have a very hard time joining those two types of members together 
because each has different objectives.
BORER: Does that make a difference in the jobs that they do? If they join 
because of their dedication to the goal, do they become suicide bombers, or if 
they join for money, do they do a different task? Is there a connection between 
these things?
MIRONOVA: Yes, and I think this is the biggest problem HR is trying to solve. 
Because while it’s okay to have the people who join for money, the organization 
cannot not give them something important to do. Imagine people who join the 
US military. You will take people who want to join for the GI bill.5 That’s fine; 
you need people on the ground level. But can you imagine promoting a person 
who is not interested in the goals of the organization? If you did that, then the 
whole organization below him would know he doesn’t care about the mission.
So, the biggest problem those guys in the terrorist HR have is to ensure that the 
people who are promoted are the most motivated people. Look at ISIS. In the 
beginning, when it had just started, it was taking only very dedicated fighters. 
It was a small brigade, and its members had to take a lot of risks. They were 
very motivated people. Then when ISIS was holding more territory and it had 
to govern it, it brought in a lot of people who were interested only in material 
benefits. It had to bring in people who pretended that they were pro-ISIS, but 
the only thing they had to do was stamp a paper, like a traffic violation. Did 
ISIS leaders care if these people believed in the ISIS idea? No, not as long as they 
could stamp papers. But at the top levels, they needed to ensure that they had 
people who were actually dedicated to the goals of the group. Those things actu-
ally change with time, however. When ISIS ran out of people who wanted to join 
even just for money, or when it ran out of money to convince those people to 
join, it went to conscription. Now, for example, I believe that in some ISIS-held 
territory, everyone who is older than 12 has to serve in ISIS. 
BORER: Do you think that suggests that they are reaching the end of their 
recruitment base, or are there still a lot of people they can coerce or force to join?
MIRONOVA: I was in Iraq on the front line when the Mosul operation started 
[in the fall of 2016].6 I think ISIS is doing very, very badly. Internal motivation is 
nonexistent. We interviewed some defected security agents—they were not just 
fighters. It is almost impossible for people who want to defect from ISIS to do so. 
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There are too many of them, and ISIS is not happy with that, so they are being 
shot on sight. So it’s really hard to defect, and morale is extremely low. 
Is this a good thing or a bad thing? That’s a different question. I think it’s a bad 
thing because we have all these Syrians and Iraqis who joined ISIS for money, 
right? Now they don’t get paid anything because ISIS is very low on money. It 
even cut food rations. So all those guys who want to defect will go back to their 
lives or become refugees. But, what’s left is this core group of dedicated people, 
and particularly foreign fighters who burned their passports and who know they 
are on all possible terrorist lists. They are all over YouTube. Those guys are going 
to be stuck. You know what happens when you corner a dog? They are going to 
have two options. In either case they are going to die, but the question is, are they 
going to die alone, or are they going to take a lot of people with them? I am not 
saying it was an easy campaign to push them towards this edge. I am just worried 
that they are not going to want to die alone. There is no amnesty. They burned 
their passports, and they don’t have an option. There is nowhere they can go.
BORER: Well, it seems that, if you were a local person, you might be able to 
survive if you were to defect. If you were an Iraqi fighter who had joined ISIS 
because of your sectarian preference, you would just join some part of the Sunni 
militia, whether it supported ISIS or something else. From your knowledge on 
the ground, is there a program by the Iraqi government to actually pull these 
fighters back into the state, or are they at high risk for being put in prison or 
somehow punished?
MIRONOVA: I talked to some government officials in Iraq about what happens 
when these fighters come back to the village, and by the laws of Iraq, they are going 
to have to go to prison. We know for sure that the leaders of ISIS in Syria right now 
are moving their families to Anbar Province to hide them among the local popula-
tion. But they cannot hide themselves—they are too well-known. So, they are 
thinking about Libya, because they have to go somewhere. I understand that; they 
have to go somewhere. The foreigners who defected go to prison for life.
BORER: Are you familiar with the ISIS prophecy of the final battle in Dabiq?7
MIRONOVA: Yes, I am familiar in theory, but I don’t think it has any reality, 
especially in terms of military strategy. 
BORER: I’m curious: if there is this prophetic moment, would it be a good policy 
to try to make that happen? Can we take those committed hard-core foreigners 
who are going to die somewhere—they can’t go home, and they are not from 
the local place—and create a “Dabiq”—that is, purposefully start a “final battle,” 
whether in Dabiq or elsewhere?8
MIRONOVA: That would be nice, especially if you could go and do it in an 
unpopulated area. It would help a lot. Otherwise, it would just start another 
insurgency because civilians are not going to be happy with us bombing them all 
over the place. There is another option, although I know it’s not a very good one, 
but think about the FARC in Colombia.9 They were huge, they were very dan-
gerous, and people were terrified of them. Now they control a piece of forest the 
size of my backyard. Are they bad? Yes, they are rather bad. Are they annoying? 
Yes, they are rather annoying. Are they a danger to the world? No. But that’s 
THEY ARE GOING TO 
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54
This street was just retaken 
from ISIS
Friendly civilians who offered 
us cover in their house.  The 
first thing they said was “Do not 
take a picture with this stupid 
beard.”  They then asked if we 
had cigarettes (smoking was not 
allowed by ISIS). They haven’t 
left the house for the past two 
weeks during the fighting and 
told us that ISIS fighters who are 
now fighting against us on their 
street are Russian speakers – 
from Tajikistan and Kazakhstan 
(and one Syrian).
Clearing the house where there 
is/was a sniper. They did not 
find the sniper but did find his 
equipment.
CTX | Vol. 7, No. 1
where all the leadership stayed—they are sitting in their forest. I understand this 
is not going to happen with ISIS because they have too many fighters and they 
were too loud about killing people on TV. 
ELIZABETH SKINNER: So, you’re suggesting that we should give ISIS a little 
town somewhere? Like the Indian Maoists, reduced to living in a forest in 
eastern India?
MIRONOVA: Exactly. I understand that, from a political perspective, no one 
could suggest it, but if you take the FARC as an example, the group was down-
sized to the most dedicated people, and they are sitting in a forest. It’s not going 
to kill them off, but it’s really going to decrease the danger. 
BORER: But the question is whether their ideology is able to make the com-
promise. The FARC had a certain capacity to accept a deal, if they were able to 
convince themselves it was in their interest. If you gave them an autonomous 
zone and said this is FARC land, it seemed that the FARC leaders would be open 
to that. My question is, do you think that the intensity of the ISIS message and 
all of their propagandizing has boxed ISIS’s leaders into a place where they really 
can’t negotiate? Or do you think that they would?
MIRONOVA: They would negotiate. Propaganda is nice, and these norms are 
totally fine when it is not your life on the line. When you’re reduced to survival, 
forget about ideology. When we talked to this defected security agent, he said 
that half of ISIS are going to convert to Christianity if it pays well enough. 
SKINNER: There is the FARC example, but then there is also the Lord’s Resis-
tance Army example. They have been pretty weak for a long time, and all they 
have been able to do is wreak havoc on villages throughout the border regions 
of Rwanda and Uganda and Congo for 30 years. But they haven’t been able to 
promote their ideology; they haven’t been able to do anything but cause pain 
and suffering to local areas. My question is whether that might be another way 
for ISIS to continue, as this cancerous sore on the Syria-Iraq border, for decades.
MIRONOVA: Don’t forget that a lot of foreign fighters are ex-drug addicts who 
found religion. A lot of them converted. They are in poor health. It’s going to 
reduce their life span after the war, even if they survive the war. 
BORER: Many of these insurgencies have been resolved, or at least partially 
resolved, by governments offering amnesty or reintegration programs, by basi-
cally saying, we will allow you to keep your military units, and then reintegrating 
them into official security forces in some form. Do you see such an idea as being 
possible, considering the widely different actors—the Iraqi government, the 
Syrian government, the Turkish government, the international community—
that are involved? Do you see any possibility that there could be a coordinated 
resolution other than a military resolution?
MIRONOVA: I don’t agree with the idea of reintegrating ISIS fighters. Why would 
you reintegrate them? Why would you make a special unit to integrate them and 
create a bigger population of jihadis? You’re taking chances doing that because 
they have the possibility of bringing more people into their command structure. 
But you could leave them together to do their own thing, while keeping them 
under control. I am not saying leave ISIS alone to continue fighting, but I am 
saying that there are cases when that kind of strategy [of isolation] worked before 
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because there is always the question of what to do with the fighters once the 
fighting is over. 
BORER: A number of people have argued that, if somehow the war against ISIS 
were successful and ISIS were destroyed, a new ISIS would be born, because the 
fundamental grievances and issues throughout the Middle East region are going 
to inspire somebody to create a new type of jihadi Islam. Do you agree with that?
MIRONOVA: Yes, absolutely. First of all, there is no money coming into this 
region. The number of kids being born during the war didn’t even decrease that 
much, so even if the war ends, where are people going to get the money and 
whatever else they need to survive? The governments will not provide that. So, of 
course there will be more trouble coming. Even now, the Nusra Front is gaining 
power extremely quickly.10
BORER: If you were able to give the US president advice on what the United 
States should do about ISIS, would you have him continue the [Barack] Obama 
administration’s small footprint approach? Would you say this is not a fight the 
United States should be involved with? Or would you do what many people in 
Congress, like Senator [ John] McCain, have said, that we need more boots on 
the ground? In other words, escalate, stay the same, or deescalate?
MIRONOVA: Unfortunately, it’s too late to not do anything. The United States 
lost the moment when it could do something slowly and carefully, and now 
Russia is in there. The United States cannot afford to simply stop being involved 
all of a sudden. But the question is, even with “boots on the ground,” who exactly 
do we bring in there—people who are going to fight this war? No, that’s not a 
great idea. Advisors to advise them on how to fight or maybe how to run the 
country? In fact, the majority of Syrian brigades have fallen apart, not because 
of military defeat but because they don’t have any training on how to manage 
budgets, HR, logistics, and so on. Politicians like to say they are going to send in 
advisors. Advisors on what? We need to make sure we are actually doing some-
thing worthwhile.
BORER: So, how would you organize your brigade. How would you supply it? 
How would you discipline your troops? How would you train them on what was 
the acceptable use of violence? 
MIRONOVA: Stopping corruption even at the brigade level would help. A lot of 
militias and fighters left the fight, including Islamist groups, complaining about 
the corruption. You don’t want to work in an organization that has corrup-
tion. And after the war is over, corruption is going to be a problem again if the 
country is not run properly, and it will continue to be a source of grievance. 
BORER: I like to conclude these interviews with what I call the “king for the day” 
or “queen for the day” question. If you were in charge of some aspect of these 
fights and you could get something done—say if you were nominated to be the 
US Secretary of Defense—what would you try to do?
MIRONOVA: I would increase the Fulbright program. It’s really not a military 
thing, but I teach at the American University of Iraq as pro bono staff. I go in 
there from time to time, and these students are going to be leaders of that nation 
later on. If people don’t know how to run the country, they are going to fail, and 
then the next time, the voters are going to vote for someone even more far-right 
because people think that’s going to solve the problem. They are going to follow 
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a more hard-core person, like Putin in Russia. There need 
to be programs that educate the future leaders from those 
countries—not just for the military, but that educate them 
in, for example, public policy and economics. Right now, 
in Iraq, they need people to run the ministry of finance, 
the central bank, the ministries of transportation, educa-
tion, and internal security, but they don’t have people with 
the education and experience for those positions—the 
technical bureaucrats. 
SKINNER: Before we finish, I have one 
more question. There have been con-
flicting stories about the level of involve-
ment of former Ba’athists—former 
officials of the Iraqi government under 
Saddam Hussein—in ISIS. Some people 
claim that the Ba’athists are running ISIS, 
while other people are saying, no, that’s 
overstated. What did you find out about 
the level of Ba’athist participation, if 
anything? 
MIRONOVA: The Ba’athists know how to run an orga-
nization, so I think they help in that way. The question 
is, what is their actual involvement? I think they are very 
strong on a local, technical level. The leaders of ISIS are 
hard-core military guys. But people didn’t like the way 
they were being governed and were protesting, so the 
leaders changed their policies. That is the definition of 
democracy, in my opinion. ISIS has the same governance 
problem that the states do. The bureaucrats are in it for 
the paycheck, absolutely. Those guys are professionals. So, 
of course, ISIS is happy: “Oh, my God, good employees. 
Let’s take them before someone else takes them because 
we are not going to be able to compete with anyone for 
their services.” 
BORER: This is part of the appeal, as far 
as I know, because the Shi’a-dominated 
[Iraqi] government excludes those 
people [former officials under Saddam 
Hussein] even though they are techni-
cally competent. They are politically 
unacceptable because they are associated 
with the old regime along sectarian lines. 
So, where are they going to go? 
MIRONOVA: It does not matter whether 
bringing these bureaucrats into ISIS is 
politically or ideologically acceptable. If the group needs 
those people, it will modify its propaganda to include 
them. Those are just words—who cares? v
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1  The Combating Terrorism Archive Project (CTAP) aims to 
collect and archive knowledge on strategy, operations, and tactics 
used by military and other security personnel from around the 
world in the twenty-first-century fight against global terrorism. 
Collectively, the individual interviews that CTAP conducts will 
create an oral history archive of knowledge and experience in 
counterterrorism for the benefit of the CT community now and in 
the future.
2  This interview was edited for length and clarity. Every effort 
was made to ensure that the meaning and intention of the 
participants were not altered in any way. The ideas and opinions 
of all participants are theirs alone and do not represent the 
official positions of the US Naval Postgraduate School, the US 
Department of Defense, the US government, or any other official 
entity.
3  For a look at Mironova’s recent activities in Mosul, see Eric 
Schmitt, “Papers Offer a Peek at ISIS’ Drones, Lethal and Largely 
Off-the-Shelf,” New York Times, 31 January 2017: https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/world/middleeast/isis-drone-
documents.html
4 Editor’s note: For more about how ISIS organizes its labor needs, 
see Vera Mironova, “ISIS Prisons: Where Labor Demand Meets 
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5 The “GI Bill of Rights,” officially the Servicemen’s Readjustment 
Act of 1944, is legislation originally passed by the US 
Congress to provide education, housing, health, and other 
benefits to World War II veterans. It has since been expanded 
to cover anyone who has served in the US armed forces.
6 What is being called the Battle for Mosul began when Iraqi, US, 
and coalition forces launched a major operation to force ISIS out 
of the northern Iraqi city, the last ISIS stronghold in Iraq. The 
fight is ongoing. For details, see “Battle for Mosul: The Story So 
Far,” BBC World News, updated 21 March 2016: http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37702442
7 Dabiq is a small Syrian town that ISIS doctrine declares will be the 
site of the final battle between Islam and the West, in which the 
forces of Islam will finally prevail.
8  Editor’s note: To learn more about religious fundamentalism and 
the role of biblical prophecy in armed religious movements, see 
Jonathan Nagle, “Fundamentalism: The Branch Davidians and the 
Islamic State,” in this issue.
9  The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) waged a 
vicious insurgent war against the Colombian government for 50 
years. The two sides recently negotiated a peace deal.
10 Jabhat al-Nusra (now Jabhat Fateh al-Sham) is a splinter of the 
Islamic State of Iraq, which was the immediate precursor to ISIS. 
After the two groups had a falling-out over strategy and goals, the 
members of al-Nusra split off to concentrate on the fight against 
the Assad regime. 
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This interview is taken from the collection of the Combating 
Terrorism Archive Project (CTAP).1 On 3 February 2017, noted terrorism expert 
Dr. Bruce Hoffman, director of the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown 
University, visited the US Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, Cali-
fornia. Dr. Michael Freeman of the Defense Analysis Department at NPS spoke 
with Dr. Hoffman about the lessons on counterterrorism in Dr. Hoffman’s 
history of the founding of Israel, Anonymous Soldiers: The Struggle for Israel, 
1917–1947 (Knopf, 2015), and about the West’s strategies to defeat ISIS and Salaf-
ist terrorism.2 Global ECCO’s Amina Kator-Mubarez and CTX editor Elizabeth 
Skinner sat in on their discussion.
MICHAEL FREEMAN:  Why did you decide to devote 600 pages to the history 
of the founding of Israel?
BRUCE HOFFMAN: The book is a detailed study of how terrorism affects 
government policy and decision making. It looks at how both Arab and Jewish 
terrorism influenced British policies and decisions during the time that Britain 
ruled Palestine, from 1917 until they decided to leave in 1948. It came from my 
frustration with a lot of the political science studies of whether or not terrorism 
works. Governments and political leaders always say it doesn’t work—the victims 
of terrorism say it doesn’t work. But there is this fundamental paradox: if it 
doesn’t work, then why has terrorism existed for two millennia, and even more, 
why has it become so entrenched and dominant as a strategic threat, in addition 
to the tactical threat that it always has been? In other words, if terrorism is such 
a failed strategy, then why does it persist? I thought that the only way to really 
know this was to take a very detailed look at the archives on how governments 
frame policies and also, on a day to day basis, how the police, the military, and 
the intelligence services react and respond to terrorism. 
Palestine-Israel was such a good case study because, first, the events described in 
the book happened over 70 years ago, which means that there is a particularly 
rich body of archival information available in multiple countries, in Britain cer-
tainly, but also in Israel and the United States. It’s only by going to the archives 
that we really begin to understand how terrorism factors into governments’ 
decisions and policy making and how they react to it. It’s very rare that you can 
get as complete a picture as is captured in Anonymous Soldiers. 
FREEMAN: So you have seen evidence that officials changed policies based on 
terror attacks, showing that, to some degree, these attacks worked to change 
policy?
HOFFMAN: Yes. Part of the argument of the book [Anonymous Soldiers] also 
is that history is rarely mono-causal. Where I think terrorism does play a big 
part is when it speeds up events, but it may not have the effect that terrorists 
claim because, historically, there are very few instances where terrorism actually 
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succeeded at achieving its users’ goal. But the catalytic effect that terrorism has 
can narrow a government’s opportunities to make decisions, or really flesh out 
policy, by goading governments to respond emotionally rather than soberly. 
That’s what terrorism is all about, and I think it’s been used more successfully 
than we give terrorists credit for. 
Now that’s not to praise or encourage terrorism, but it’s rather to say that 
defeating terrorism is much more critical than we imagine, and much more time-
intensive. The dangers of ignoring terrorism’s second- and third-order effects, 
or indeed, of precipitously declaring victory, are enormous because all terrorists 
seek to enmesh their adversaries in protracted wars of attrition to help to under-
mine confidence in government leadership. We saw that happen in Palestine and 
also back in Britain during the formation of Israel. Terrorism imposes profound 
economic pressures on government, something that was very clearly true when 
100,000 British troops were tied up in Palestine during and after World War II. 
Some of them had been drafted in January 1944 and were still in the military, 
but now fighting in Palestine three years later. Terrorism also attempts to compel 
liberal democratic governments to embrace illiberal solutions in pursuit of 
their security, which is also exactly what happened in the Palestine case. Ter-
rorism helps to deepen fissures in societies and polarize political opinion. All 
those outcomes were present in Britain after World War II in the context of the 
Palestine issue, and in recent months, we have seen those same factors at play in 
the United States and Western Europe. 
FREEMAN: One of the things I have always thought was odd is when people 
say terrorism doesn’t work, but we have to ask, then why do terrorists do it? 
Terrorism could actually be the most rational strategy for an insurgent group, 
even if it never works, as long as it’s the most likely course of action to work. The 
probability of success can be a fraction of one percent, but if every other option 
is zero percent, it still might actually be a completely rational decision, even 
if it has always failed in the course of history. So when you have some of these 
cases of success, like in the Algerian war for independence, the use of terrorism 
actually becomes more rational because the insurgents can say, well, it might 
only work in two or five or 10 percent of the cases, but that’s enough because we 
can model our plans on that. This is why I think the contention that terrorism 
doesn’t work seems to be a false debate, because it simply has to work better than 
the alternatives, in the calculations of its users. 
HOFFMAN: You are absolutely right. At a very minimum, simply attracting 
attention to themselves and their cause means that the use of violence succeeds. 
But you have also fastened on another important point. People will say there 
are only a handful of well-known examples when terrorism was effective, but 
that’s exactly the point. That handful of well-known examples has served to 
subsequently motivate and inspire similarly aggrieved peoples to believe that, if 
they turn to violence, they too can thrust their cause onto the world’s agenda. 
That’s what is so important about the Palestine example. I argue in Anonymous 
Soldiers and—in a more condensed fashion—in Inside Terrorism3 that modern 
terrorism—this belief in violence as a means of communication to mobilize 
support, to pressure government, and to attract attention to oneself and one’s 
cause—really crystallized with the campaign of the Irgun Zvai Le’umi, the Na-
tional Military Organization, led by a future prime minister of Israel, Menachem 
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operations—what was then called propaganda, a word 
that’s just as negative these days as terrorism is. More 
clearly than anyone else at the time, I believe, Begin under-
stood the fusion between violence and communication, 
and how daring and dramatic acts of violence could focus 
the world’s attention on the terrorists and their cause and 
transform a local problem into an international cause. 
FREEMAN: Terrorism was thought of by the anarchists as 
“propaganda by deed.” 
HOFFMAN: Yes, exactly. Begin and the Irgun were taking 
advantage of what was modern media then—radio, in 
particular, but also simply the ability to transmit news 
quickly to a wide audience—not visual news, but first-
hand immediate accounts of events. So Begin definitely 
took advantage of that, and also of the creation of the 
United Nations. He was the first real terrorist leader who 
directly appealed to the United Nations to intervene. 
We have seen that since then, of course, until arguably, al 
Qaeda, because al Qaeda sees the United 
Nations as a manifestation of Western 
world dominance as much as anything 
else. But whether it was the PLO, the 
IRA, or any other insurgent or terrorist 
group, these underground movements 
have often sought the recognition that 
they could obtain through an important 
international body like the UN. 
FREEMAN: One of the things that I 
have always been interested in is the 
historical roots of terrorism versus 
what’s new about modern terrorism. 
It seems that how terrorists see the 
strategic utility of terrorism and how 
they think about the impact on democracy or an audience 
of policy makers are fairly consistent through time, right? 
If Begin were put in charge of some terrorist group today, 
he wouldn’t be out of place thinking about the use of 
violence in a strategic sense, maybe even in a tactical sense. 
Terrorists still essentially do just two things: shootings and 
bombings. So what are the similarities and consistencies 
across space and time among terrorist groups and terrorist 
campaigns—and counterterrorism campaigns? Also, what 
is new, what is different or modern about al Qaeda or ISIS? 
I am reluctant to buy into this “new terrorism” notion—
since 9/11 everything is “new.” But al Qaeda didn’t use 
anything new. Mass shootings in Paris and Belgium—the 
FLN [National Liberation Front] was doing that in the 
Battle of Algiers. I think people get caught up in the idea 
of newness, but I wonder what exactly you think has been 
consistent and what might be new about some of the 
threats we see today?
HOFFMAN: Well, I think the one thing that will always 
be consistent is that, as politically radical or religiously 
fanatical as terrorists might be, historically, they are 
operationally conservative—that is, they go with what 
works and what they believe will facilitate the success of 
an operation. This is why guns and bombs have been the 
stock-in-trade of terrorism for over a century. Terrorists 
today focus much more on mass casualty operations 
because they see that as the essential ingredient for a suc-
cessful terrorist operation, not least to get publicity and 
attention. For that reason, I think Brian Jenkins’s famous 
aphorism from 1975, that terrorists want a lot of people 
watching and listening but not a lot of people dead, has 
unfortunately become anachronistic. Terrorists still want 
people watching and listening, but they also want a lot of 
people dead because they think that’s the vehicle that will 
ensure them attention and publicity. Also, as I have often 
written, I think the religious element 
became salient after 9/11, but this was 
certainly already changing at the end 
of the twentieth century. Religion has 
made mass casualty terrorism much 
more legitimate and justifiable for some 
groups because their conception of a 
constituency is different. Their motiva-
tion became divinely ordained—they 
wanted not so much a role at the United 
Nations as to completely eliminate their 
enemy. This shift is behind the ethnic 
cleansing and sectarianism that we see 
driving so many conflicts in the Middle 
East.
FREEMAN: Does this make these terrorists harder to 
negotiate with?
HOFFMAN: I think they were easier to negotiate with in 
the past because they saw themselves as changing a system 
of government and replacing it with an alternative system, 
or with achieving some goal of political independence 
or self-determination. Whereas now, I think that when 
religion gets mixed into the motivation, eliminating a rival 
people whom they disdain is often an end in itself. It’s all 
about getting power, of course, as terrorism has always 
been, but now they also want to overturn the current 
world system. They see the United Nations not as pro-
viding them with a voice in the way that terrorists of the 
twentieth century did, but rather as part of the repressive 
status quo machinery. 
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Operationally, I don’t think a lot has changed. Bombs are 
smaller and much more powerful than they used to be, and 
so are handguns and automatic weapons, but terrorists still 
use these two basic weapons systems. What’s changed is 
that the most effective terrorist organization is the one that 
lasts the longest or is a true learning organization. These 
organizations consciously study other groups, so you see 
successive terrorist generations that generally are more dif-
ficult to eliminate and more operationally competent than 
their predecessors because they are learning how to survive 
from the remnants of previous groups. The power we 
once had to intercept and interdict and therefore prevent 
terrorist attacks has been rendered considerably less useful 
by off-the-shelf commercially available or even free com-
munications apps like WhatsApp or Telegram. We know 
that these things played an enormous role, for instance, in 
planning the 2015 Paris attacks. 
FREEMAN: You’re talking about how terrorists, the smart 
ones, learn from history and become more resilient, 
smarter, better. That’s one side of the fight. Are states 
doing the same thing? If we do a net 
assessment, history might overall be 
neutral or favor one side or the other, de-
pending on whether one side is better or 
worse at learning from it. You say terror-
ists, or at least the good ones, are like the 
bugs that don’t get killed by antibiotics 
but instead become superbugs—bigger, 
stronger, better—right? We’re aca-
demics; we’re trying to get smarter about 
this—but are policy makers and states 
wiser now than they were 60 years ago? 
Are we learning from history equally, or 
less, or more than terrorist groups?
HOFFMAN: The simple answer is no. We are dismal at 
it, in fact. We constantly reinvent the wheel because we 
forget General [ James] Mattis’s admonition that “the 
enemy gets a vote.” I don’t think we fully realize that our 
enemies, whether ISIS or al Qaeda, have locked us into 
wars of attrition. We don’t realize that we are up against 
enemies who, because of their divine inspiration, see this 
as a successive, generational struggle. The other problem 
is that, although on an individual basis within agencies 
there is continuity, generally speaking, we are always 
reinventing the wheel. We certainly saw this in the past 
decade with the revival of counterinsurgency: much like 
after the Vietnam War, the conventional military sought 
to completely eschew any involvement in this messy type 
of warfare. With the drawdowns in Iraq and then Af-
ghanistan, we saw a very similar mindset emerge, a belief 
that the next war is going to be a conventional one against 
a nation state. It might well be, but it’s not an either-or 
prospect. We see that there are more and more terrorist 
groups forming. There are also more branches and 
affiliates that are attaching themselves to existing terrorist 
groups, which multiplies the problem. 
Terrorist groups have to learn, or they don’t survive. 
National survival is rarely at stake because of terrorism, 
which is why we have this very odd attitude. We tend 
to overreact in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist 
attack, but then, as time proceeds, we become much more 
complacent until we are once again spun up by a new ter-
rorist incident. Unfortunately, that’s part of the terrorist 
strategy: to constantly take us on that rollercoaster in 
order to diminish our will. That’s what we always have to 
guard against, but as you know, in 2005, the phrase “the 
long war” was banished from the Pentagon. How could 
you describe this as anything else? In 2005, we really 
faced only one adversary, and that was al Qaeda. Now we 
face al Qaeda and ISIS and also a multiplicity of terrorist 
branches and affiliates of both.
ELIZABETH SKINNER: Along those 
lines, there are all the terrorists groups 
in India, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba [LeT], 
Indian Mujahedeen, and others that 
seem to be bandwagoning with ISIS. 
Are these groups really going to follow 
along and adopt ISIS’s agenda, or do you 
think they are going to end up fighting 
for supremacy at some point? Or do you 
think they have completely different 
agendas?
HOFFMAN: Well, all these groups are opportunists, and 
they will hitch their fortunes to whatever rising star they 
see because they believe that simply associating them-
selves with a violent and powerful terrorist organization 
enhances their own credibility. And they certainly hope 
that it enhances the threat they pose in the eyes of their 
enemies. I think what’s interesting about terrorists in the 
twenty-first century as opposed to the twentieth century 
is that in the past many of them had mostly local or per-
haps regional agendas, but the newer groups have become 
progressively internationalized—at least in their rhetoric. 
I remember years ago you could actually go to the web 
pages of terrorist groups like LeT, before they were all 
taken down, and even though its agenda is primarily 
about the liberation of Kashmir, its home page showed 
three flags dripping in blood: India’s, as one might expect, 
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because India is in possession of Kashmir, but also the United States’ and Israel’s. 
So even back then, they had already internationalized their agenda. Terrorist 
groups, because of their opportunism, seek whatever sources of support and 
sustenance they can get. They understand that if they can broaden their appeal 
and gain new constituencies through alliances or popular support beyond their 
birthplace or their own narrow locus of operation, that will be a force multiplier 
and enhance both their power, and they hope, their longevity. So they form 
alliances of convenience that are constantly shifting depending on the popularity 
of the group they might associate with. But it doesn’t mean that any of these 
affiliations is necessarily carved in stone. Of course, the fact that many of these 
groups receive state support, whether actively or clandestinely, or at least are 
tolerated by states makes the whole problem of terrorism much more difficult to 
counter today than it’s been in the past. 
FREEMAN: So, you see that, at least for as long as ISIS is ascendant, groups like 
LeT will continue to associate themselves with it, at a minimum?
HOFFMAN: I think their DNA is the same as al Qaeda’s and that’s really their 
most stable long-term relationship. I think there are elements within these 
groups who are impatient or who see the upstart terrorist group as the next 
best thing and are opportunistically taking advantage of it. But I don’t see these 
associations with ISIS as being much of a long-term trend because most of these 
groups remain more in the al Qaeda mainstream. Where they fit together the 
most is probably in ideology. Their general ideologies aren’t that different. 
The differences, most often, are in personalities—tone or style or certainly, 
leadership.
FREEMAN: Going back to what you were saying about states learning and the 
fact that states don’t face the existential threats that terrorists do: if terrorist 
groups lose, they are dead and destroyed, while states can muddle through the 
aftermath and aren’t forced to learn and remember the lessons very well. In your 
book [Anonymous Soldiers], I know you don’t go past 1947, but the Israelis, prob-
ably more than anybody, have faced an existential threat for the last 60 years. Do 
you think that they have learned lessons about counterterrorism and terrorism 
better than other countries because they have had to deal with it so much—at 
least more so than the United States or others? Also, Britain, right? Britain 
hasn’t faced an existential threat to the same degree as Israel, but more so than 
most from their experiences in Palestine, Oman, Yemen, Malaysia, and Kenya, 
and then Northern Ireland. But they are still trying to figure this out, even with 
all the advantages of history and with many of the same people. The United 
States has a fleeting historical relationship with terrorism on its soil, in the 1970s 
and 1980s, a little bit in the late 1990s, and then with 9/11. But there are other 
countries that have a more consistent history with terrorism. Do you think that 
they are any better at learning better lessons than the rest of us? 
HOFFMAN: No, I don’t think so. Israel in one sense sees terrorism as a perpetual 
state of regional politics, of international relations—the nature of conflict. I 
think they are also very attuned to its dynamic and evolutionary nature. A de-
cade ago, suicide terrorism was the main threat, but then both the 2006 war with 
Hezbollah and especially the 2014 summer war with Hamas were not fought 
with suicide terrorists; they were fought with stand-off weapons, by rockets 
fired by both adversaries. So I think Israel in general has been better at learning. 
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I don’t think it necessarily comes from Israel’s own historical background as 
much as from the nature of where Israel exists: its leaders have had to constantly 
monitor any changes and know if they might be susceptible or caught off bal-
ance. For example, in the First Intifada, when they dealt with suicide terror in 
the 1990s, they brought it under control, but then they saw a very different type 
of suicide terrorism that was demographically more diverse and more sustained, 
and that caught them completely off balance. In a short period of time, the 
Israelis were able to change strategies and come up to speed because the survival 
of the population was enormously important. 
Britain is a very good case study in not learning from the past and making the 
same mistakes in serial conflicts. If you remember the Robb-Silberman commis-
sion that looked into the intelligence behind the Iraq WMD claims, one of its 
conclusions discussed the danger of inherited assumptions, and I think that was 
the case with both Britain and France.4 What they did learn were more often the 
wrong lessons or the most convenient lessons—in other words, they assumed 
that what worked in one place would automatically work in another, instead of 
understanding the very different cultures, very different socioeconomic condi-
tions, very different political dynamics in each place. 
You can’t have a one-size-fits-all counterterrorism strategy. You have to cus-
tomize it and tailor it. I think what’s interesting about Britain is that it’s really 
not until the 1980s, a decade and a half after the more recent iteration of the 
Troubles in Northern Ireland had manifested, that British leaders finally began 
to learn lessons and turn their policies around. The effect of that strategic shift 
was that, within about a decade of adopting it, they had the Good Friday Agree-
ment, and the conflict was over. It took them from 1968 until the early 1980s to 
realize what they had to do, and then another decade to get it right, but they had 
the patience to see it through. 
FREEMAN: Let’s talk about ISIS, the Islamic State. What do you think of them 
as a threat? What do you think of them as a terrorist group? Where are they 
headed? If you were king for the day, and you got to coordinate all international 
CT policy against ISIS, what would your recommendations be? It’s a small ques-
tion. [Laughter]
HOFFMAN: Well, there are two things. In a short period of time, ISIS has gone 
very far, which means its influence and impact, and even its existence, need to 
be eliminated. But I think ISIS is here to stay for the foreseeable future, even 
as it has lost territory and lost fighters, even as we’ve killed its leaders. Its more 
“conventional” capabilities will be eroded, even its capacity for insurgency will be 
diminished, but its international terrorist capability is going to continue. 
FREEMAN: Will it increase?
HOFFMAN: I certainly think that while we were fixated on the idea that ISIS 
was just interested in Syria, the Caliphate, and Iraq, and that the violence would 
remain confined to that region, ISIS was laying down roots in Europe and 
elsewhere—an external operations capability that I think functions somewhat 
independently from its battlefield operations. This means that whatever defeat 
is inflicted on ISIS on the ground, whether in Libya or Iraq or eventually Syria, 
it will still have an external terrorist operations capability. In addition to all the 
motivations and goals that exist today, layered on top of that will be revenge 
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and retaliation for the destruction of the Caliphate. So I 
don’t think we should be blinded by the assumption that 
anything that’s going on now is more than the beginning 
of the end—it’s not the end. I think the decapitation 
strategy that we have pursued is a very important and 
useful tactic in countering terrorism, but in and of itself, 
decapitation, historically, has never eliminated a terrorist 
group, and I think ISIS will be able to transition from the 
ISIS we see now to a terrorist entity that will continue to 
be threatening. 
FREEMAN: As I understand it, there have been three 
leaders of ISIS, and the effectiveness of a leadership 
decapitation strategy depends on how good the leader is. 
The first leader, [Abu al-] Zarqawi was pretty effective in 
mobilizing this group of fighters. The next guy, Abu Omar 
al-Baghdadi, was not too effective, and we killed him. His 
replacement [Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi] is actually the one 
who has expanded the war. So sometimes the effective-
ness of leadership targeting depends on whether the guy 
is actually doing a good job, because it 
might be better to leave him in place. 
HOFFMAN: The key to understanding 
the strategic limitations of targeted 
assassination is understanding that it 
may have second- or third-order effects 
that we need to anticipate. There was an 
article in the Washington Post that talked 
about how we had gotten the six top 
leaders of ISIS, Abu Mohammad al Ad-
nani being the main one. Fair enough, 
but we also have to understand that we have eliminated 
the hardcore people who were real Baghdadi loyalists and 
completely bought into ISIS’s enmity with al Qaeda and 
its rivalry with [Ayman] al Zawahiri. Similarly, it’s great 
to kill off the leaders, but we have to be prepared for what 
the long-term repercussions might be. One of them may 
be that we eliminated all of the ISIS leadership’s most 
implacable opponents to a reamalgamation with al Qaeda. 
In terms of cohesion, leadership depth, and control over 
its branches, al Qaeda is much stronger than ISIS. The 
one thing it doesn’t have is a very strong external opera-
tions capability in Europe, and that’s partially because al 
Zawahiri, at least for the past three years, forbade those 
types of terrorist operations. I think this is because he 
has been intent on very quietly rebuilding al Qaeda while 
ISIS hogs the limelight, monopolizes our attention, and 
further exhausts and enervates us as part of this overall 
war-of-attrition strategy. But then that also means that if 
he doesn’t exercise the capability to strike, he doesn’t really 
have it. 
So this is where I think ISIS is ahead of al Qaeda and has 
something al Qaeda covets—this external operations net-
work in Europe—which I would argue also makes some 
reamalgamation quite possible. Only a few years ago, the 
conventional wisdom was that this split was completely 
irreparable, that because of infighting both groups would 
consume and ultimately neutralize one another. To me, 
that was a fundamental misreading of terrorist history 
because factions and splinters tend to be more violent 
than the parent organization. They have to be able to get 
recruits and support to demonstrate their relevance to 
the cause. That’s exactly what we saw with ISIS and with 
al-Baghdadi declaring himself Caliph and reestablishing 
the Caliphate. 
FREEMAN: You’ve talked about some missed opportuni-
ties with al Qaeda. In hindsight, would you have done 
something differently in the last 15 years? Or would you 
do something differently now? 
HOFFMAN: The [George W. Bush ad-
ministration’s] aversion to putting suffi-
cient US ground forces into Afghanistan 
when [Osama] bin Laden was fleeing, 
particularly when he was in Tora Bora—
history would have been different had 
we killed bin Laden then. I think it was 
enormously important to kill bin Laden 
whenever we could get him. When 
we succeeded, it did knock the group 
off balance at a critical time, especially 
during the Arab Spring [2011–2012]. But 
after a decade in retreat, the group itself had developed a 
robust enough leadership cadre that it could carry on the 
struggle. Bin Laden had worked himself up to being an in-
spirational figure, which he might not have been if we had 
found and killed him sooner. After all, for a decade, he 
survived the greatest onslaught directed against a terrorist 
organization in history and probably the most extensive 
manhunt in history. That burnished his credentials and 
gave al Qaeda this appealing image that was much more 
difficult to dim. 
I think that was the first mistake. Again, this is all in 
retrospect. But even looking back at it, I saw the diversion 
of assets from Afghanistan to Iraq in 2003 first hand—I 
was in both places. The invasion of Iraq played into al 
Qaeda’s narrative that the United States and the West 
were waging a global war against Islam. Again, none of 
this is to second-guess those in authority at the time or say 
they should have made a different decision. What I mean 
to say is that we didn’t fully take onboard the second- and 
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third-order effects or the long-term repercussions of 
groups that are determined to survive. We didn’t assess 
ahead of time how they would likely intend to survive, 
so that when they did survive, we were often taken by 
surprise. How many times in the past five years have we 
heard that al Qaeda was on the verge of strategic collapse? 
Those exact words were used. Yet when General James 
Clapper, the director of national intelligence, testified 
before the Senate in February [2016], he talked about 
how al Qaeda was becoming increasingly resilient and was 
poised to make further gains in that year.5 So much for the 
strategic collapse. 
We can debate until the end of time whether a status of 
forces agreement could have been agreed with in Iraq. 
Leaving even 10,000 troops in Iraq would have given 
us the influence over the government to prevent the 
resurgence of terrorism and the rise of ISIS. But I think 
what’s incontestable is that the mistakes 
we made in 2010 and 2011 resulted in a far 
more perilous situation in Iraq today than 
would have otherwise existed. Again, 
these are indirect effects of allowing ISIS 
to revive—seeing Iraq now basically 
broken apart by ISIS’s invasion. There 
were opportunities we missed that could 
have resulted in a different history today. 
Right now, I think the most serious 
mistake we are making is not dealing 
decisively with the terrorist threat, in the sense that we 
have allowed ourselves to fall into the terrorists’ trap of 
this war of attrition. I am not saying that it is a successful 
strategy or that it will prove so, but we see the terrorists’ 
goal of undermining popular confidence in elected leader-
ship materializing today—and this is a phenomenon not 
just in the United States, but in Europe—creating deep 
polarizations and political divisions within society, the 
economic pressures of maintaining a constant op tempo 
regarding domestic security, sustaining overseas military 
deployments, and maintenance of extensive intelligence 
capabilities. This pressing of liberal societies to increas-
ingly embrace or at least to discuss illiberal solutions to 
security is the stock-in-trade that terrorists depend on. 
So, one way or the other, I think we are back in a position 
where we have to read ISIS and other extremist groups 
as a threat we have to deal with decisively and not in any 
protracted fashion. 
FREEMAN: What would a more decisive strategy entail?
HOFFMAN: I think it starts with the realization that the 
three pillars of our counterterrorism strategy for the past 
eight years haven’t worked. Leadership decapitation has 
kept our enemies off balance but has not delivered any 
kind of a crushing blow to them. By my count, al Qaeda 
now has a presence in at least three times as many places 
as it had in 2008. According to the National Counterter-
rorism Center, when we began the campaign against ISIS 
in 2014, it was present in five countries. In 2015, it was 
15, and now it’s 18 countries. Clearly, even while we had 
success decapitating both groups, they were seizing more 
territory and also polishing their brand. The second pillar 
was the training of host-nation militaries—which has 
failed abysmally, whether in Mali and Yemen or Iraq and 
Afghanistan. I am not saying these things aren’t critical 
to a counterterrorism policy; I’m just saying they are not 
working in their current form and they have to be part 
of a broader strategy. No place where we have trained 
indigenous forces have we had a success 
against terrorism. Even in the current 
push against Mosul, if the Iraqi security 
forces could do it themselves, it would 
be a lot more positive, but they are de-
pendent on both the Kurdish Peshmerga 
and even more problematically, the Shi’a 
popular mobilization forces. Just a few 
years ago, Yemen had been touted as a 
success story. So the way we are doing 
CT now isn’t working. 
The third pillar, the counter-messaging, counter-narrative 
strategy also failed, in my view. ISIS has over 40,000 
foreign fighters from more than 100 countries, so clearly 
the message isn’t getting out there. 
So the first imperative for the new [Donald Trump] 
administration is to step back and ask why all these things 
that are central parts of a counterterrorism strategy are 
not working? What more needs to be done or what addi-
tional resources need to be brought to bear? A decade and 
a half ago, we believed there was a purely military solution 
to terrorism. We found out there wasn’t, but that’s because 
policy makers overemphasized reliance on the military. In 
the past eight years, we have swung in the opposite direc-
tion: having decided that there isn’t a military solution, 
we’ve tried more specific types of targeting, training host 
nations, counter messaging, but that hasn’t worked either. 
The answer is to find what is in the middle, and I think 
it’s using military force to break the backs of the terrorist 
organizations. Once that’s done, I believe the non-kinetic 
dimensions are invaluable in preventing the recrudes-
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kinetically diminishing the power of these groups, we can’t diminish their allure. 
That’s where I don’t think we have been successful. 
FREEMAN: On the counter messaging, I saw a story in the New York Times 
about a group called the Legion for ISIS, who were ISIS propagandists.6 The 
United States and its allies have gone after these guys pretty aggressively, and the 
ones who were killed have not yet been replaced. It was interesting to me because 
we don’t usually think of counter messaging as kinetic. But this is a similar 
argument to leadership targeting: if there aren’t any effective replacements for 
them, it might be effective to take out 10 or 20 of these guys who are doing the 
ideological outreach and propaganda. 
HOFFMAN: Again, my point is that the answer is not one or the other; it’s fusing 
both together, and the main lesson may be that the propaganda chief is the most 
important person to take out instead of the actual operational commanders. 
There is a problem in that, too, because many of the propagandists did become 
operational commanders, but that sort of targeting probably does have a greater 
impact: it enhances the non-kinetic counter messaging by removing these key 
voices. But, of course, we killed Anwar al-Awlaki, and his old sermons are still 
tremendously effective at motivating individuals. 
AMINA KATOR-MUBAREZ: As far as Syria is concerned, how difficult is it for 
the United States to distinguish rebel groups versus ISIS? At this point, does 
it make more sense for the United States to allow Assad to try to defeat ISIS, 
because it’s so difficult to distinguish groups?
HOFFMAN: Well, the trouble is that I think there were more legitimate rebel 
groups the United States could support two or three years ago than there are 
now. A lot of the more moderate groups have been eliminated by Assad, and by 
rival groups, too. What we don’t realize is that for many of these groups it’s a 
zero sum game. In all these conflicts, there has been a whittling away of all but 
the most extreme forces, especially as the conflicts have become more protracted 
and more violent, and extremists thereby gain greater cachet. You now have this 
proliferation of Salafi jihadi groups and the exclusion of the more secular, more 
moderate groups, which makes finding allies on the ground more difficult. This 
goes back to my point, that the longer you allow these things to play out, the 
more complicated they become and the more difficult they are to handle. So I 
think addressing the problem earlier on would have been more effective. 
What probably worries me most is that the longer the war is prolonged, the 
more appealing the Russians’ stasis solution [keeping Assad in power] will be to 
other powers as well because they see no solution, whereas it was a very different 
situation some years ago. 
FREEMAN: I see three alternative outcomes: ISIS winning all of Syria, Assad 
reestablishing control over all of Syria, or some negotiated amalgamation of 
rebel groups—but that’s hard to imagine. If I were betting on any of those three, 
the Assad regime continuing in power and eventually establishing control over 
the vast majority of the country seems like the most probable outcome. It seems 
we’re caught between a rock and a hard place. We want to defeat ISIS, but de-
feating ISIS is defeating one of the rebel groups that is fighting against Assad, and 
doing so would indirectly empower Assad. He’s not fighting them directly, as I 
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understand, but if he doesn’t have to worry about fighting ISIS, he can go after 
the other rebel groups, and that helps him. Somebody is going to be in power, 
and we don’t like all the other Salafist rebel groups. There aren’t too many of the 
moderate rebel groups left. We have ISIS versus Assad. 
HOFFMAN: You’ve left out the most pernicious effect, which is that al Qaeda 
seems to be increasingly legitimate and acceptable. You don’t see the name 
al Qaeda used at all in Syria. It’s either [ Jabhat al-Nusra or now Jabhat Fateh 
al-Sham]. They avoid declaring themselves to be al Qaeda to achieve exactly what 
bin Laden wrote of before he died: he thought the al Qaeda brand had outlived 
its usefulness because it was always associated with violence and everyone 
completely neglected its political agenda. Now we see that al Qaeda has sud-
denly acquired this newfound mantle of moderation that I think is completely 
unjustified, but that people believe in. Because they don’t use the name al Qaeda, 
these groups somehow become more tolerable in certain circles and more accept-
able than they ever would have been before. 
I don’t think there are any quick solutions to terrorism. There’s no one tactic or 
technique that’s going to turn the tables. One of the things we always have to be 
thinking about is how our enemies may use what we do against us. At the end 
of the day, we have to break their power. That’s the kinetic part, but there is also 
an enormously important nonkinetic element. I believe in both. The nonkinetic 
element is absolutely important in preventing a revitalization of these terrorist 
campaigns. Things that we do can play into their narratives, which they exploit 
very effectively to get new sources of support and new recruits. So part of a 
sound and solid counterterrorism strategy is to recognize that we need to avoid 
doing things that play into their narrative—that diminish our stature while 
enhancing theirs.  v
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Honor and Truth George Lober
ETHICS AND INSIGHTS
Over dinner the other night, a friend asked me, in light of my 
recent retirement, what I learned about the students I taught over the past 
18 years—the majority of whom were military officers or civilians engaged in 
some form of counterinsurgency or counterterrorism activity across the globe. 
It was an interesting question, and one I admit I was reluctant to answer, partly 
because what I learned about my students is inseparable from what I learned 
from them—and what I learned from them is impossible to express casually over 
dinner. But the question hung in the air, so I muttered something deliberately 
opaque and changed the topic. 
Later on, I thought about my reaction and the answer that I should have given. I 
should have said that, among other things, I learned that those men and women 
live lives of profound ethical contradictions, some of which cannot be recon-
ciled. And if I was being completely honest, I would have added: Not the least 
contradictory is their relationship with Honor and Truth. 
Let me offer two disparate examples of what I mean. 
An overwhelming majority of the students I have taught cling to the role of 
the “silent professional” encouraged by their military or security-enforcement 
cultures. They keep secret the personal truths of their professional experience—
what they know, what they have done, what they have witnessed—and they do 
so at times even at the risk of their reputations and careers.  
As a case in point, imagine that you are one of the four students I taught who 
were directly involved in a mission that resulted in a highly publicized civilian 
death (or deaths), a mission that upon its completion quickly mushroomed 
beyond your control into an international incident. Imagine that during that 
mission, and preceding the civilian death, a host of unforeseen circumstances 
and general confusion erupted, so that despite your best efforts to follow 
protocol and the rules of engagement and to make the best possible decisions 
in an extraordinarily chaotic, stressful environment, the death occurred anyway. 
Then imagine that you report all of this to your chain of command, either im-
mediately upon discovering the death or upon returning from the mission. You 
acknowledge everything that was in your control and everything that was not. 
You are absolutely truthful. And the truth is that there was no way you could 
have anticipated and prevented that death.  
Nevertheless, as the public controversy over what happened grows, your com-
petency comes into question, your reputation within your own organization 
becomes tarnished, and pressure grows from within and outside the organization 
to hold you accountable. Critics demand that you receive some form of disci-
plinary action, ranging from loss of position, to demotion, to denial of future 
promotion, to imprisonment if found guilty by either a civilian or military 
court. And although the decision your higher-ups eventually reach allows you 
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to remain within the organization, the news sources’ incorrect conclusions 
regarding the incident travel across the globe. False information and rumor 
continue to be presented as fact. As a result, not only do your name and career 
incur further damage, but your personal relationships become strained. 
In considering this situation, one question that strikes me is whether the mo-
ment ever arrives when you would consider speaking out publicly in your own 
defense to set the record straight. If you were among the four students I have 
taught who found themselves in similar circumstances, you would answer, “No.”  
As a point of honor, you would, in fact, choose to say nothing beyond what 
you reported through official channels. You would choose to shield your 
personal truth of what actually happened from public examination, keeping that 
knowledge private because of your commitment to being a “silent professional.” 
Beyond official inquiry into the incident, you would share your story—your 
truth—with only an extremely small circle of highly trusted confidants. And you 
would hold to that commitment despite recurring invitations to defend yourself 
in public or to cash in financially by revealing your side of the story.
In that regard, by honoring your commitment to stoic silence, you would be no 
different from the overwhelming majority of the students I’ve taught: men and 
women who view with disapprobation those in their service communities who 
break ranks with the professional culture of silence and sell their stories—their 
personal truths—to publishers for profit. The majority of those I’ve taught per-
ceive professional reticence as equivalent to honoring a promise—an indicator of 
one’s ethical integrity.
Now imagine, in contrast, that you direct that same profound sense of honor 
toward communicating the truth. Imagine also that you work in an environment 
where you are challenged every day by a seemingly endless deluge of training 
and bureaucratic requirements that impede your ability to do the very best job 
you can. Imagine that these requirements obstruct your ability to accomplish 
your primary tasks, despite the fact that many of them—and sometimes it feels 
like most of them—are only tangentially related to your primary duties and 
responsibilities. How do you handle that situation? How do you cope with the 
unreasonable demands on your time and the unnecessary restrictions on your 
performance? Do you lie about accomplishing some of them? Do you commu-
nicate a falsehood by simply checking a box for a requirement you did not fulfill, 
or by slow-rolling an assigned task you deem unnecessary? Do you blow off some 
requirements or ignore impeding policies in order to do your job? 
If you’re among a considerable number of the students I have taught over the 
past 18 years, your answer to these questions is “Yes,” and my inevitable response 
is “Why?” 
Let me be clear: the vast majority of the hundreds of students who have been 
in my classes over the years have been noble men and women, both military 
and civilian, who fully embrace the concepts of honor and decency. They truly 
believe that their word is their bond and that living a life of integrity requires 
living as closely as possible to their core moral—and in some cases, religious—
principles. In addition, many of them are graduates of military academies across 
the globe, and most of these academies share a similar honor code that shuns 
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lying and espouses truth-telling. So why would these same 
individuals, who value their sense of honor and com-
mitment highly enough to silently endure calumny on a 
searing scale, also violate their honor and commitment to 
the truth to negotiate an organizational bureaucracy?
The answer, I believe, is complicated and not entirely 
reconcilable. It begins with the fact that, if most of my stu-
dents can find any general consensus around some positive 
aspect of lying and deceit, it comes when discussing 
the pressures involved in serving within an immense 
bureaucracy. Such pressures, they tell me, result from a 
constant stream of ever-increasing training requirements, 
restrictive policies, and leadership demands, which lead 
many of them to conclude that they have no choice but 
to occasionally deceive or lie so they can accomplish 
their primary mission. This assertion is borne out by the 
2015 United States Army War College 
report by Leonard Wong and Stephen 
J. Gerras, Lying to Ourselves.1 In it, the 
authors identify almost all the frustra-
tions my students have expressed over 
the years and conclude that “untruth-
fulness is surprisingly common in the 
military” as the result of a burdensome 
environment of ever-increasing require-
ments and obstructive policies.2  
As evidence, Wong and Gerras cite a 
2002 analysis, which concluded that 
company commanders had to find ways 
“to fit 297 days of required training into 
256 training days,” and a 2012 Inspector 
General’s report, which indicated that all 
16 Army companies that were inspected 
as part of the Army Force Generation process were unable 
to complete all of the required training and tasks.3 
Because of “the Army’s tendency toward zero defect,” 
however, the authors suggest that reporting any non-
compliance was not then—and presumably is not now—a 
viable option.4 The authors contend that military leaders 
instead face a limited series of options, ranging from 
“hand-waving, fudging, massaging, or checking the box” 
to “evasion and deception.”5 As they firmly state, “in the 
routine performance of their duties as leaders and com-
manders, US Army officers lie.”6
The report further alleges that whether in garrison or 
downrange, soldiers are confronted with a flood of cum-
bersome bureaucratic requirements and potential ethical 
confrontations, which result in what Wong and Gerras 
call ethical fading, whereby the “moral colors of an ethical 
decision fade into bleached hues that are void of moral 
implications.”7 Or in less poetic terms, “ethical fading al-
lows us to convince ourselves that considerations of right 
or wrong are not applicable to decisions that in any other 
circumstances would be ethical dilemmas.”8 
How does this ethical fading occur? The report argues 
that it occurs when expressions such as “checking the box,” 
“giving them what they want,” “prioritizing,” “accepting 
prudent risks,” and “good leadership” become justifica-
tions for deliberately resorting to falsehoods.9 Perhaps 
worse, however, the report suggests that the actual 
outcome for the perpetrators is an ethical numbing, a 
disengagement from the deceit generated by their signa-
tures and false statements, and the rationalization that 
compromising one’s personal and professional honor is 
merely a “means to maneuver through 
the Army bureaucracy.”10
My “truth” is that nothing in the Army 
War College report surprises me, 
nor do I believe that the problems it 
identified are germane solely to the US 
Army. In my experience, the difficul-
ties and issues that Wong and Gerras 
describe are common to many of my 
American students, regardless of their 
branch of service, and are shared by 
many of my international civilian and 
military students as well. What the 
report does not address, however, is the 
level of frustration that surfaces among 
my students as a result of being caught 
in such ethical binds. For some, the 
ultimate consequence of feeling that if they are going to 
succeed professionally, they have little alternative but to 
compromise their integrity, is nothing less than a scar-
ring cynicism—an outcome the philosopher Sissela Bok 
asserts “can have far reaching effects on both internal and 
external trust.”11
So, on the one hand, many of the students I teach feel an 
absolute ethical imperative to honor their vow to protect 
the truth, while on the other hand they feel equally pressed 
at times to abandon their honor and commitment to the 
truth, due to the priorities of their current assignment, an 
unreasonable number of training requirements, and the 
burdensome bureaucratic environment in which they serve. 
Thus I have learned that while many of them will some-
times forsake the truth and prevaricate, if not actually 
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lie, to circumvent the requirements and restrictions they 
perceive as “dumb” or “bullsh*t,” they will also shield and 
protect the truth of a specific experience at great emo-
tional, social, and even professional cost to themselves—
and they will do so as a point of honor.
How are these two perspectives on Honor and Truth 
reconcilable? Beyond a mutual inclination to protect or 
cloak the truth, I’m not sure they are. Nor 
am I sure they have to be. The philoso-
pher Carl Ficarrotta might suggest that 
what I have learned about my students 
is that “perfectly ordinary human beings 
are capable of forming extremely com-
plicated . . . dispositions,” and there is no 
psychological reason “to think we cannot 
form complex, context-sensitive moral 
dispositions.”12 In other words, we are all 
capable of flipping certain internal ethical switches and 
acting according to different ethical codes depending on 
the situation and context. 
It may be just as simple as that. It may be that untruth-
fulness and deceit become no big ethical deal when 
deployed as “work-arounds” to an impossible deluge of 
demands and restrictions—especially if the practice is 
both common and accepted. Wong and Gerras certainly 
suggest as much with their assertion that “much of the 
deception that occurs in the profession of arms is encour-
aged and sanctioned by the military institution.”13 Even 
so, I’m not so sure the answer is that cut-and-dried for 
my students. More than a few of them chafe at the need 
to flip such internal ethical switches, and many resent the 
fact that their organizations put them in the position of 
having to compromise their personal honor and com-
mitment to the truth for the sake of accomplishing their 
jobs, even if the practice is commonplace. The result for 
some, I believe, is an erosion of the truly altruistic values 
that drove them to serve in the first place; for others, it 
is a gradual transition into disillusionment and resigned 
acceptance. 
In the end, I think what I have learned 
about my students and what I have 
learned from them is that they live 
in very ethically gray professional 
worlds where the dilemmas they face 
range across a complex spectrum, and 
the choices they make are not always 
consistent, much less reconcilable. The 
falsification of compliance require-
ments in one instance and the steadfast commitment to 
reticence and stoicism in another are but two examples 
of the military’s complex relationship with Honor and 
Truth. But I have learned that for the men and women 
I teach, the effort to live an ethically consistent life is an 
uphill climb—just as it is for everyone—and along the 
way, almost all of them are doing the best they can.  v
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Out of the Mountains:  The Coming Age of 
the Urban Guerrilla
Reviewed by Fatih Celenay
THE WRITTEN WORD
David Kilcullen, whose books include The Accidental Guerilla: 
Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (Oxford University Press, 2009), 
Counterinsurgency (Oxford University Press, 2010), and Blood Year: The Unravel-
ing of Western Counterterrorism (Oxford University Press, 2016), is a strategist 
and counterinsurgency expert. He served for 24 years as a soldier, diplomat, 
and policy advisor for the Australian and United States governments. Between 
2007 and 2009, he was a special advisor to the US secretary of state and a senior 
advisor to General David Petraeus in Iraq. 
In Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla, Kilcullen uses a 
multi-disciplinary approach that includes urban design, human rights, diplomacy, 
community mapping, systems design, alternative energy, and rule of law, among 
others. He argues that four megatrends—population growth, urbanization, lit-
toralization, and networked connectivity—will affect not only the issue of conflict 
but all aspects of life on the planet. Kilcullen’s main argument focuses on the ef-
fects of the four megatrends on the nature of conflict and the urban environment.
These megatrends highlight significant changes that are taking place in urban 
life. Because urban populations in coastal regions are getting denser, more 
clandestine—or “dark”—networks, which control flows of people, money, 
goods, and information outside the government-regulated channels, are likely 
to emerge in these areas. These networks benefit from increasing connectivity 
and emerging communication technologies, and their potential dangers are also 
embedded in their highly-connected nature. Kilcullen uses the 2008 Mumbai 
terrorist attack, which was carried out by Lashkar-e-Taiba, a terrorist organiza-
tion based in a mountainous region of Pakistan, to illustrate this point. He 
maintains that Lashkar-e-Taiba not only launched the most audacious maritime 
terrorist attack in India’s history but also showed that, with the democratization 
of connectivity and technology, non-state actors like terrorist organizations can 
conduct appallingly effective raids anywhere in the world.
Kilcullen then applies the four megatrends to a study of four megacities: 
Mogadishu, Somalia; Lagos, Nigeria; Kingston, Jamaica; and Mumbai, India. 
According to the UN’s 2010 population report, the world’s population will be over 
nine billion by 2050, and 75 percent of this population will be living in coastal 
cities. Kilcullen asserts that population growth, urbanization, and coastal density 
may lead to the rise of what some call “feral cities” all around the world. Ac-
cording to Richard Norton, a professor at the US Naval War College, a feral city is 
a metropolis with a population of more than one million people, in a state whose 
government cannot maintain the rule of law within the city’s boundaries even 
though the state remains a functioning actor in the greater international system.
Kilcullen cites Kingston, Jamaica, as an example of a city with districts that are 
not fully controlled by the national government. Rapid population growth and 
unplanned urbanization, lack of governance capacity, youth unemployment, 
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and residential segregation are the main reasons for the city’s problems. The 
Kingston neighborhood of Tivoli Gardens displays a hybrid internal/external 
pattern in which the Jamaican government and the non-state actors that con-
trol the district have a symbiotic relationship. Christopher Coke, a Kingston 
gangster who headed an international drug and weapons trafficking network 
called the “Shower Posse,” tightly controlled Tivoli Gardens until his arrest in 
2010. Coke’s organization had a strong relationship with then-Prime Minister 
Bruce Golding, the leader of the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), supporting the JLP 
in elections in return for government services. In 2010, however, the Jamaican 
government ended the relationship by launching a military operation against the 
Shower Posse.
The theory of competitive control is another important issue Kilcullen raises 
in Out of the Mountains. This theory says that whichever local armed actor the 
population perceives will be best able to establish a stable and predictable system 
of control is most likely to dominate the population and territory. The Shower 
Posse in Jamaica, the clan militias in Somalia, and the Taliban in Afghanistan are 
perfect examples of this theory: they tend to outcompete potential opponents 
and exert control over the local populations. 
According to Kilcullen, most future conflicts will occur in urban areas. Military 
planners should therefore prepare the whole military system to fight in a densely 
populated, highly connected, littoralized urban area. The opposition forces will 
mostly be non-state actors. As a result, existing military doctrines and publica-
tions like FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency; FM 3-06, Urban Operations; and JP 3-26, 
Counterterrorism, need to be revised and updated according to the emerging 
needs of the urban battlefield.1 The narratives of the 2011 uprisings in Tunisia, 
Egypt, Libya, and Syria are relevant to potential conflicts in different parts of the 
world because they offer explicit examples of the future of guerilla warfare and 
terrorism. What is more, virtual theaters, unmanned aerial vehicles, and cyber 
warfare—the components of remote warfare—will become increasingly impor-
tant in the near future. 
Kilcullen draws a clear picture of the future of guerilla and urban warfare. He 
defines the four megatrends by giving examples and statistics supported by scien-
tific information and data analysis. For example, when he discusses population 
growth, he uses data from the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
and several articles published in well-known journals and magazines to support 
his points.2 He defines the littoralization megatrend based on sources such as the 
CIA’s World Factbook and the United Nations Environment Program,3 while he 
draws his descriptions of non-state actors and the flow of their activities from the 
work of researchers like Sean Everton, who study these dark networks.4 
The book has a very strong argument overall, but there are a couple of points 
that the author needs to clarify. First, forming a strategy against a military threat 
is a complex job. Kilcullen states that military planners have to consider the four 
megatrends and the nature of the threat together. The easy part of military strat-
egizing is the description of the problem. The hard part is how to conceptualize 
the means to deter and defeat the enemy. The book offers good ideas for military 
planners, but it does not contain much information for field operators. In addi-
tion, Kilcullen does not give a persuasive answer to the question of why future 
conflicts will bypass rural areas. Even if an increasing number of conflicts emerge 
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in coastal megacities, that does not mean that future wars will occur mostly in 
these highly populated regions. Perhaps it would be better to say that the future 
of guerilla warfare will be a mixture of rural and urban conflicts.
The Afghanistan and Iraq wars show that not all wars and conflicts occur in 
littoralized or densely populated regions. Terrorist networks like al Shabaab, 
the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers’ Party), and the Taliban still make extensive 
use of mountainous regions as safe heavens inside Somalia, Turkey, Iraq, and 
Afghanistan. They need these rugged terrains because, in most circumstances, it 
is safer for their fighters to be outside of urban areas during the training, prepara-
tion, and organization phases of operations. Because most countries’ security 
and armed forces are located in urban areas, it would be unwise for a terrorist 
organization to choose an urban area as its base. When a state-run army faces 
a similar, conventional force, it is highly probable that the conflict will occur 
in densely populated areas. But when an army fights an unconventional force, 
fighting is likely to take place in both rural and urban areas. It seems clear to me 
that terrorist networks will continue to use rural areas for their operations in 
addition to the densely populated urban areas. 
I see Out of the Mountains not as a set of solutions but as a description of im-
portant demographic changes, which can help people understand the changing 
environment of war and encourage them to think about new solutions to 
emerging trends. I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in insur-
gency and counterinsurgency studies. The traditional views of insurgency and 
counterinsurgency have been changing in recent years, and the four megatrends 
described by Kilcullen will have a profound effect on the future nature of war 
and insurgency. v 
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U.S. Special Operations Forces in a Period of Transition  
by Dr. Francisco Wong-Diaz, Esq.
Dr. Wong-Diaz, an expert in international security law, looks at the effects of the 
post-Cold War strategic environment on SOF. After the fall of the Soviet Union 
in 1989, there was hope for a more peaceful world order. That changed after the 
shock of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. A resurgent Russia and a rising Communist 
China, along with failed states, humanitarian crises, and ungoverned spaces, cre-
ates a strategic security environment that is complex and dangerous. As former 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey once stated, 
“We now face multiple, simultaneous security challenges from traditional state 
actors and transregional networks of sub-state groups.” Dr. Wong-Diaz looks at 
the threats to US vital interests, our strategy for dealing with those threats, 
and our reliance on third offset technologies that are innovative, disruptive, 
and advantageous to the United States. He concludes with a look at the human 
dimension of SOF within USSOCOM and the global SOF network (GSN). The GSN 
strives for interoperability and is a key component of the indirect approach: an 
interoperable network of networks to achieve operational success.
These recent JSOU Press publications are available electronically in the JSOU Press Publications 2016 and 2017 sections of 
the JSOU Library Management System: https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications
Special Operations Forces as Change Agents  
by Jessica Glicken Turnley, Ph.D.
Dr. Turnley uses a cultural anthropologic lens to explore the socio-cultural as-
pects of the SOF community and their ability to perform as change agents. As the 
author explains in her introduction, “Well-positioned or particularly persuasive 
individuals from the SOF community have been able to use personal connections 
and social networks to catalyze and institutionalize change in a wide range of 
communities, stimulating individuals to coalesce around ideas presented through 
charismatic players.” Through the use of historical examples, such as the Office 
of Strategic Services (OSS) in World War II or the more recent Joint Special 
Operations Task Force–Philippines (JSOTF-P),  Dr. Turnley guides the reader 
through explanations of organizational change and the modern day SOF operator 
who is creative and performs as a change agent within established bureaucracies. 
She arrives at the conclusion that, “SOF bring to the military the potential for 
change, realized through an ability to create, stimulate, and work through social 
networks and the power of individual personalities.”
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Preventing Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation—
Leveraging Special Operations Forces to Shape the Environment  
by Colonel Lonnie Carlson, Ph.D. and Margaret E. Kosal, Ph.D.
US Army Colonel Lonnie Carlson (Ph.D.) and Dr. Margaret Kosal argue that 
WMD expertise must be built within the SOF enterprise and that SOF must 
collaborate with government organizations (both US and partner nation) to 
conduct WMD counterproliferation-related building partnership capacity (BPC) 
and operational preparation of the environment (OPE) activities. The authors 
look at SOF attributes and assert that it is within the irregular warfare domain 
that SOF have the greatest opportunity to improve WMD counterproliferation 
effectiveness. The authors present a brief explanation of WMD classifications, 
present an inventory of countries that possess weapons-grade nuclear material, 
and graphically present the potential cost versus probability of use for WMD 
types. Colonel Carlson and Dr. Kosal conclude that the US government and 
Department of Defense must build and leverage the global SOF network through 
CWMD OPE and BPC activities. Those activities can lead to the early warning 
needed to mitigate fleeting opportunities to eliminate catastrophic WMD risks.
IS and Cultural Genocide: Antiquities Trafficking in the 
Terrorist State  
by Russell D. Howard, Marc D. Elliott, and Jonathan R. Prohov
In this monograph, the authors offer compelling research that reminds govern-
ment and military officials of the moral, legal, and ethical dimensions of protecting 
cultural antiquities from looting and illegal trafficking. Internationally, states gen-
erally agree on the importance of protecting antiquities, art, and cultural property 
not only for their historical and artistic importance, but also because such property 
holds economic, political, and social value for nations and their peoples.
Protection is in the common interest because items or sites are linked to the 
common heritage of mankind. The authors make the point that a principle 
of international law asserts that cultural or natural elements of humanity’s 
common heritage should be protected from exploitation and held in trust for 
future generations. The conflicts in Afghanistan, and especially in Iraq and Syria, 
coupled with the rise of the Islamic State (IS), have brought renewed attention to 
the plight of cultural heritage in the Middle East and throughout the world.
Cultural Intelligence for Special Forces Personnel  
by Russell D. Howard, Greta Hanson, and Carly Laywell
In a 2009 JSOU Press monograph reflecting on the education requirements for SOF 
personnel, Brigadier General Russ Howard (US Army, Ret.) identified “cultural 
competency” as critical to SOF professional development. He returns to this theme 
with researchers Greta Hanson and Carly Laywell by answering this question: why 
can some people act effectively in new cultures or among people with unfamiliar 
backgrounds, while others, even highly respected people within their own group, 
stumble in those same situations? The research team asserts that cultural intel-
ligence (CQ) makes the difference and describes a proficiency that goes beyond 
simply being intelligent, emotionally mature, or having good general social skills. 
Their message to SOF is that a person with high CQ, whether cultivated or innate, 
can understand and master situations, persevere, and do the right thing.
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